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ABSTRACT 
For governmental audit and compilation reports to be relevant, they must be prepared and 
made available to the public in a timely manner.  The purpose of this study is to identify 
variables that have an influence on audit and compilation report delay in governments.  This 
research utilizes ordinary-least-squares regression to estimate the effects of several variables of 
interest on the time it takes to file the audit or compilation report with the Office of the State 
Auditor.  The research also utilizes logistic regression to estimate the effects of several variables 
of interest on the incidence of filing the audit or compilation report after the state-mandated 
filing deadline versus filing on time.  Data were gathered from audit and compilation reports of 
Mississippi counties and municipalities for fiscal-year 2007. 
The research questions addressed in this study were chosen based on the anticipated 
impact on audit timeliness of (1) report message content and managerial competency, (2) 
accountability, and (3) the audit environment.  The results of the study indicate that the areas of 
report message content and managerial competency as well as the audit environment both play 
an important role in audit report and compilation report timeliness.  The government’s level of 
accountability was found to be less associated with report timeliness. 
A higher number of audit findings was found to be associated with longer audit report 
delay and longer compilation report delay as well as with late audits and late compilations.  
Entities receiving an adverse or qualified opinion were significantly associated with longer audit 
report delay as well as with late audits.   The travel distance between the auditor’s office and the 
audit client’s office was also found to play a role in audit and compilation report timeliness.  For 
iii 
 
full-scope audit engagements, a greater travel distance was associated with late audit filings, 
particularly when entities that represented their audit firm’s only governmental attestation client 
were removed from the sample.  Travel distance played a more important role with compilation 
engagements, as it was significantly associated with compilation report delay and was associated, 
to a lesser degree, with late compilation reports.  A greater amount of long-term debt carried by 
the governmental entity was not found to be associated with shorter audit delays but was found 
to be somewhat associated with audits filed within the state-mandated one-year window.   
Overall, these results provide useful information for both small and large governmental entities 
that wish to improve the timeliness of their financial reporting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
DEDICATION 
This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Laurie Cagle, who has stood by me and 
supported me throughout this process from beginning to end and who has listened with genuine 
interest to everything I have had to say regarding this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS 
CAFR  Comprehensive annual financial report 
CPA  Certified Public Accountant 
GAAP  Generally accepted accounting principles 
GAGAS Generally accepted government auditing standards 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
GASB  Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
GEE  Generalized estimating equation 
GFOA  Government Finance Officers Association 
NFMA  National Association of Municipal Analysts 
OCBOA Other comprehensive basis of accounting 
OLS  Ordinary least squares 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OSA  Office of the State Auditor 
SEC  Securities and Exchange Commission 
VIF  Variance inflation factor  
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 I owe my deepest gratitude to my dissertation committee: Dr. Dale Flesher, Dr. Annette 
Pridgen, Dr. Rick Elam, and Dr. John Bentley.  Thank you all for your time, guidance, patience, 
and willingness to work with me on this research project.  I appreciate all of your contributions 
and have genuinely enjoyed working with you on this project. 
 I would also like to thank each of the accounting faculty at The University of Mississippi.  
You have all been great examples for me to follow.  I have learned a lot from each of you, and I 
hope to pass on that knowledge to my future students. 
 In addition, I am especially grateful to all the accountancy Ph.D. students I was lucky 
enough to be able to enjoy this experience with: Dereck Barr, Bill Black, Randy Bunker, Dan 
Harris, Dana Hart, Eric Sims, Barbara White, Kelly Williams, and Jack Winstead.   I am honored 
to have been able to work alongside each of you, have learned a lot from each of you, and 
consider you all to be very good friends. 
 I would also like to say a special thank you to Dr. Jim Shelton (who himself was a Ph.D. 
graduate of the Ole Miss accounting program) for being an early influence in the classroom and a 
great example for me to aspire to.  I would like to thank Derek Graham for helping me get my 
first job, and I would also like to say a special thank you to Tom Carson Jones for providing me 
with valuable practical experience and for ultimately helping me get my first academic job. 
 Also, I would like to thank my family and friends for encouraging and supporting me 
during my studies.  I would especially like to thank my wife, Laurie, and my daughter, Claire, for
vii 
 
allowing me to take the time necessary to devote to this process.  Finally, I would like to thank 
God for giving me wisdom and guidance and for blessing me with a wonderful life. 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………... ii 
DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………………... iv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS………………………………………………... v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………………... vi 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………………….. x 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………………. xiii 
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………….. 1 
   Governmental Financial Reporting and Concerns for Timeliness……………………………..  2 
   Concerns for Audit Timeliness in Mississippi…………………………………………………. 4 
   Statement of the Research Questions…………………………………………………………... 7 
   Research Design and Methodology…………………………………………………………... 11 
   Results………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 
   Importance of the Research…………………………………………………………………... 17 
   Contributions of the Study……………………………………………………………………. 18 
   Limitations of the Study…………………………………………………………………….… 20 
   Organization………………………………………………………………............................... 20 
CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………... 22 
   Prior Research of Audit Delay in Local Governments……………………………………..… 22 
   Significant Variables from Prior Research of Audit Delay in Local Governments………..… 39 
   Prior Research of Audit Delay in School Districts…………………………………………… 41
ix 
 
   Prior Research of Audit Delay in For-profit Entities……………………………………….… 42 
CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………………… 46 
   Hypothesis Development………………………………………………………………...…… 50 
   Compilation Engagements……………………………………………………………….…… 63 
   Empirical Models………………………………………………………………………...…… 64 
CHAPTER IV – RESULTS…………………………………………………………………..… 68 
   The Sample…………………………………………………………………………………… 71 
   Descriptive Information – Full-scope Audit Engagements………………………………...… 72 
   Results – Full-scope Audit Engagements…………………………………………………..… 81 
   Additional Procedures – Full-scope Audit Engagements…………………………………..… 91 
   Compilation and Agreed-upon-procedures Engagements………………………………...… 111 
   Descriptive Information – Compilation Engagements……………………………………… 114 
   Results – Compilation Engagements……...………………………………………………… 117 
   Additional Procedures – Compilation Engagements……………………………………...… 124 
CHAPTER V – CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS…………………………………..… 131 
   Summary of the Findings……………………………………………………………….…… 132 
   Implications………………………………………………………………………………..… 140 
   Limitations……………………………………………………………………………...…… 141 
   Future Research……………………………………………………………………...……… 142 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………...… 144 
APPENDIX……………………………………………………………………………….…… 149 
VITA………………………………………………………………………………...………… 161
x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
1.  Prior Studies of Local Government Audit Delay………………………………………….… 23 
2.  Variables Prior Studies Have Shown to be Significantly Associated with Audit Delay….… 40 
3.  Description of Variables………………………………………………………………….…. 66 
4.  Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Full-scope Audits and a Comparison    
     of Late and Timely Audits………………………………………………………………...… 73 
5.  Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Full-scope Audits and a Comparison 
     of Cities and Counties…………………………………………………………………..…… 77 
6.  Bivariate Correlation Coefficients among Variables; Full-scope Audit Engagements…...… 80 
7.  Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Full-scope Audit  
     Engagements……………………………………………………………………………….... 82 
8.  Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings of Full-scope   
     Audits……………………………………………………………………………………...… 83 
9.  OLS Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Classified as Material Weaknesses  
     Contribute to Delay of Full-scope Audits…………………………………………………… 93 
10.  Logistic Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Classified as Material  
     Weaknesses Contribute to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits……………………………..… 94 
11.  OLS Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Not Classified as Material    
     Weaknesses Contribute to Delay of Full-scope Audits…………………………………...… 95 
12.  Logistic Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Not Classified as Material  
     Weaknesses Contribute to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits……………………………..… 96 
xi 
 
13.  OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How the Number of Reported  
     Major Funds Contributes to Delay of Full-scope Audits………………………………..……98 
14.  Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How the Number of  
     Reported Major Funds Contributes to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits………………...… 99 
15.  OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel Distance  
     Contributes to Delay of Full-scope Audits………………………………………………… 101 
16.  Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel Distance  
     Contributes to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits………………………………………..… 102 
17.  Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Full-scope Audits;  
     Outlying Data Point Included……………………………………………………………… 104 
18.  Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings of Full-scope  
     Audits; Outlying Data Point Included……………………………………………………… 105 
19.  Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Full-scope Audits of  
     Municipalities……………………………………………………………………………… 107 
20.  Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings of Full-scope  
     Audits of Municipalities…………………………………………………………………… 108 
21.  Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay of Full-scope Audits: DELAY   
     Measured by Date on the Audit Report……………...…………………………………….. 110 
22.  Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Compilations and a Comparison  
     of Late and Timely Compilations……………………………………………………..…… 115 
23.  Bivariate Correlation Coefficients among Variables; Compilation Engagements……..… 118 
24.  Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay: Compilation Engagements…… 120 
 
xii 
 
25.  Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings of  
     Compilation Engagements………………………………………………………………..... 121 
26.  OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel Distance  
     Contributes to Delay of Compilation Engagements…………………………………..…… 125 
27.  Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel Distance  
     Contributes to Late Filings of Compilation Reports……………………………..………… 126 
28.  Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Compilation Engagements;  
     DELAY Measured by Date on Compilation Report……………………………………..… 129 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
1.  Frequencies in Which Full-scope Audit Reports Were Submitted to the Mississippi Office 
     of the State Auditor for Fiscal-year 2007…………………………………………………… 17 
2.  Frequencies in Which Compilation Reports Were Submitted to the Mississippi Office of  
     the State Auditor for Fiscal-year 2007……...……………………………………………… 114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of a financial-statement audit is to provide a level of assurance 
concerning whether an entity’s financial statements are presented fairly in conformity with 
specified criteria.  For local governmental entities, audited financial statements are the primary 
means for communicating the results of operations and financial position to outside parties.  The 
auditor’s report also provides important information about the management of the government, 
such as the adequacy of internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations.  For 
auditors’ reports to be relevant, they must be prepared and made available to the public in a 
timely manner. 
Many smaller governmental entities are not required to undergo a full-scope audit of their 
financial statements.  These entities are allowed to prepare a compiled financial report that 
presents the government’s cash receipts and disbursements during the period.  In lieu of a full-
scope audit, these entities are subject to an independent auditor’s performance of certain agreed-
upon procedures, such as confirmation of cash balances, verification of tax collections, and 
examination of compliance with purchasing requirements.  Like full-scope audit reports, these 
compilation reports are the primary means for communicating information about the 
management of the government.  To be relevant to interested users, these reports must also be 
prepared and made available to the public in a timely manner. 
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Governmental Financial Reporting and Concerns for Timeliness 
The timeliness of governmental financial reporting is of primary interest to many parties, 
including the U.S. Congress, federal granting agencies, creditors, government officials, and 
private citizens.  The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), whose mission is to 
ensure greater accountability and well informed decision making through excellence in public-
sector financial reporting, highlights the importance of the timeliness of audited financial 
statements.  GASB Concepts Statement No. 1: Objectives of Financial Reporting lists timeliness, 
along with relevance, reliability, understandability, comparability, and consistency, as one of the 
six qualitative characteristics necessary for effective financial reporting.  The GASB further 
states within that Concepts Statement that “if financial statements are to be useful, they must be 
issued soon enough after the reported events to affect decisions” (GASB 1987, p.24). 
Jones et al. (1985) suggests that the inclusion of timeliness in Concepts Statement No. 1 
was perhaps in response to the results of a study the GASB published in 1985, which indicated 
that approximately 90 percent of all users of governmental financial reports believed timeliness 
to be an important characteristic of governmental financial reporting.  Of 72 items investigated 
by the GASB in that study, timely issuance of audited financial reports was most often rated by 
interviewees as “useful” or “extremely useful”, thus ranking timeliness as one of the most 
important aspects of financial reporting. 
It appears, however, that the timeliness objective has not often been achieved in 
governmental financial reporting.  In the mid-1990s, the GASB conducted a series of focus-
group sessions, which resulted in interviewees complaining that municipal audit delay had 
become a significant problem for financial statement users (Crain & Bean 1998).  Many of the 
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participants in these studies indicated that the best improvement in financial reporting would be 
to require the timely production of audited financial reports (Crain 1998).   
In 1998, the National Federation of Municipal Analysts (NFMA), an organization with 
the goals of promoting professionalism in municipal credit analysis and furthering the skill level 
of its members, issued a position paper concerning the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC)’s amendments to Rule 15c2-12.  According to the SEC, the amendments to that Rule were 
designed to enhance the quality, timing, and dissemination of disclosure in the municipal 
securities market.  The NFMA’s position paper stated that “the goal of increasing the availability 
of timely information has been hampered by the absence of a filing deadline” (NFMA 1998).  
The NFMA stated that outdated financial information is, at best, worthless, and, at worst, 
materially misleading with respect to the current condition of the issuer.  The Federation 
recommended that amendments be further modified to require annual updated information to be 
filed within 180 days of fiscal year end for tax-supported governmental bond issues and within 
120 days for revenue-bond and private-activity-bond issues.  At present, no such amendment has 
been promulgated. 
Currently, the timeliness of financial reporting is one of the most frequent and common 
concerns expressed to the GASB by users of state and local governmental financial reports.  In 
2005, the GASB, as part of an extensive study of the needs of users of governmental financial 
information, interviewed more than 250 financial-statement users.  One of the questions 
presented to interviewees was “What issues would you like to bring to the GASB’s attention?”.  
The overwhelming first response was that audited financial statements needed to be issued in a 
more timely manner (Mead 2011).  In a 2011 Research Brief, the GASB published the results of 
a survey of users of governmental financial statements concerning the usefulness of reported 
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financial information as time progresses.  Findings from that study indicated that financial 
information retains some of its usefulness for up to six months after fiscal year end, but the 
relative usefulness of that information diminishes quickly as time progresses within those six 
months.  That study also compared the actual time to issue audited financial statements to the 
survey results.  This comparison indicated that the reported information was seriously 
diminished due to the timing of reporting in 23 percent of larger governmental financial reports 
and 44 percent of smaller governmental financial reports (Mead 2011). 
Findings from Merritt (2010) and Mead (2011) indicated that even with the concern 
expressed by various financial statement users, the timeliness of the preparation and subsequent 
audit of governmental financial statements is not improving.  In fact, comparing the audit delay
1
 
findings from Dwyer & Wilson (1989) to the findings from Merritt (2010) and Mead (2011), the 
delay has increased by approximately two months since that earliest study.
 2
  Dwyer & Wilson 
(1989) noted an average audit delay for municipalities of approximately 107 days, while Merritt 
(2010) and Mead (2011) each noted an average audit delay of around 170 days.   
 
Concerns for Audit Timeliness in Mississippi 
Cagle & Pridgen (2011), in their examination of counties in Mississippi, reported an 
average audit delay of 420 days.  In contrast, Mead (2011) reported an average audit delay of 
around 244 days for similar-sized counties in other states.  A comparison of these studies 
provides a clear indication of the extent of a timeliness problem existing in Mississippi.  
                                                          
1
 Audit delay has been defined in prior empirical studies as the number of days from the governmental 
entity’s fiscal year end to the date of the audit report, although Dwyer & Wilson (1989) performed additional 
analysis of the time from the entity’s fiscal year end to the date the audit report was actually mailed to the 
appropriate agency.  In this current study, audit delay is defined as the number of days from the governmental 
entity’s fiscal year end to the date the audited financial statements were received by the office of the state auditor 
since that date is closer to the time in which the financial statements are available to the public. 
2
 A thorough examination of these studies is presented in Chapter II. 
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Section 21-35-31 (1) of the Mississippi Code (Code) requires all municipalities to have 
an annual audit or compilation, depending on the magnitude of the municipality’s revenues or 
expenditures.  All Mississippi counties are required to have a full-scope audit.  According to the 
Code, the engagements shall be completed before the close of the next succeeding fiscal year.  
The state has, however, experienced problems concerning the completion of those engagements 
within that specified time.  For example, in December 2009, Hinds County Supervisor, Phil 
Fisher, was quoted as saying “For years the county ran two years behind—for whatever 
reasons—getting its audit done” (Baydala 2009).  Considering the findings from Cagle & 
Pridgen’s (2011) study of Mississippi counties, which indicated an average audit delay of 420 
days, it is evident that other Mississippi counties have also experienced timeliness difficulties. 
Carslaw et al. (2007) suggests that an apparent lack of significant discipline has allowed 
governmental entities to function outside of proper accounting procedures without consequence, 
and that noncompliance provides great opportunity for fraud.  That study states that 
consequences should be introduced to ensure compliance.  The authors suggest that the 
government institute a policy that grant monies would be reduced in years subsequent to failure 
in compliance.   
Timely completion of county and municipal audits in Mississippi has become an 
important issue in the state, and new consequences have been introduced to help ensure that 
future timeliness will be enhanced.  The Mississippi Municipal Audit Guide, dated July 2010, 
outlines the steps that will be taken for those entities that fail to submit a timely audit report to 
the state auditor.  If the state auditor determines that a municipality has not initiated efforts to 
comply with reporting deadlines, the state auditor will file a certified written notice with the 
clerk of the municipality notifying that a certificate of noncompliance will be issued to the State 
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Tax Commission and to the Attorney General after 30 days unless the municipality substantially 
complies with filing requirements within that time.  If, after 30 days, the municipality has not 
substantially initiated efforts to comply, the State Tax Commission will withhold from all 
allocations and payments to the municipality the amount necessary to pay 150 percent of the cost 
of preparing the required audit or report as contracted for by the state auditor.  The State Tax 
Commission will transfer those amounts to the state auditor to be used in completing the audit.  
All funds remaining after the completion of the audit will be retained by the state auditor to 
offset administrative costs. 
In addition to the potential for counties and municipalities to lose 150 percent of the cost 
of the audit, those entities also face the danger of losing certain federal funds.  In Hinds County, 
for example, missed audit reporting deadlines have held up $1.6 million in stimulus grants for 
repaving roads and more than $1 million for beautification work.  Since local governments must 
spend stimulus dollars by certain deadlines, there are concerns that the county could lose the 
funding altogether.  Also, money allotted for beautification was from a competitive pool that is 
“first come, first served,” meaning it could go to another county or city (Baydala 2009). 
To provide a clearer picture of the extent of the timeliness problem in Mississippi, one 
can examine the mean audit delay observed in prior studies compared with the mean audit delay 
that has occurred in Mississippi.  In nine studies examining data during the periods from 1982 to 
2009, the mean audit report delay ranged from a low of 100 days to a high of 8.13 months 
(approximately 244 days).  The mean audit report delay in Mississippi for fiscal year 2007 was 
403 days for counties and 267 days for municipalities.
3
  Additionally, Payne & Jenson (2002) 
                                                          
3
 Audit report delay in these prior studies was defined as the number of days from the government’s fiscal 
year end to the date on the audit report.  In fiscal-year 2007, for Mississippi entities, the average number of days 
from the fiscal year end to the date on the audit report was 403 days for counties and 267 days for municipalities, 
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examined audit delay among eight southeastern states and observed that Mississippi had the 
longest audit delay of any of the sampled states.  A thorough examination of each of these 
studies is presented in Chapter II. 
 
Statement of the Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study is to examine what variables influence audit delay for local 
governments in Mississippi.  Since the Mississippi Code provides a one-year deadline for 
submission of the completed audits to the state auditor, this study also considers the determinants 
of late audit filings in Mississippi and what variables differ between governments that file audits 
late versus governments that file audits in a timely manner.  The study also examines what 
variables influence the delay of compilation reports for smaller municipalities in Mississippi, as 
well as the variables that differ between governments that file compilations late versus 
governments that file compilations in a timely manner.  The research questions addressed in this 
study are chosen based on the anticipated impact on audit timeliness of (1) report message 
content and managerial competency, (2) accountability, and (3) the audit environment.   
Administrators and elected officials are expected to signal fiscal competence and 
stewardship to the citizens, investors, and other users (McLelland & Giroux 2000).  Hirshleifer 
(1993) suggested that managers’ incentives are to advance the arrival of good news and to delay 
the arrival of bad news.  One circumstance in which management has incentive to signal 
competent performance is when there exists a favorable message to be reported.  Elements of a 
favorable report message include strong financial performance, an absence of audit findings in 
the auditor’s report, and an unqualified audit opinion.  A favorable report message will result, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
while the average number of days from fiscal year end to the date the Office of the State Auditor received the report 
was 489 days for counties and 344 days for municipalities. 
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part, from competent management of the governmental entity.  Concerning the impact of report 
message content and managerial competency on audit timeliness, the following research 
questions are addressed in this study: 
 
1)  Is the financial report message, as evidenced by key financial  
statement ratios, a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
2) Is the total number of reported audit findings a significant predictor of (a) audit 
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines? 
 
 3) Is a qualified or adverse audit opinion a significant predictor of (a) audit  
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines? 
 
 Differing levels of accountability may also influence the timing of the audit report.  For 
example, the presence of debt is expected to increase monitoring of municipal performance by 
creditors (Evans & Patton 1987).  Also, entities subject to the additional requirements imposed 
by the Single Audit Act have a greater level of accountability, and Single Audit reports are 
subject to earlier deadlines in which reports must be submitted to the Federal Audit 
Clearinghouse.  Concerning the impact of increased accountability to outside parties, the 
following research questions are addressed in this study: 
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4) Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor 
of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-
mandated filing deadlines? 
 
5) Is the earlier filing deadline required under the Single Audit Act a significant 
predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet 
state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
 Finally, the audit environment unique to each governmental entity may also impact the 
timing of the audit report.  The various complexities of an audit can lead to potential delays, 
while the expertise of the auditor can also have an effect on the time it takes to complete the 
audit in a timely manner.  Concerning the impact of the audit environment, the following 
research questions are addressed in this study: 
 
 6) Is the number of major funds reported in the government’s financial  
statements a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports 
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
 7) Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office a  
significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or 
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
10 
 
8) Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the 
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports 
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Smaller municipalities in Mississippi are allowed to submit a compilation report to the 
state auditor in lieu of a full-scope audit.  The auditors of those entities are only required to 
complete certain limited agreed-upon procedures.  As such, many of the research questions 
outlined above will not be applicable to those engagements.  The compiled financial statements, 
for example, are limited to a statement of cash receipts and disbursements, therefore key 
financial ratios based on accrual accounting often cannot be extracted from those statements.  
Also, the auditor expresses no opinion concerning the fair presentation of financial information.  
Finally, municipalities required to file according to the Single Audit Act must also complete a 
full-scope audit.  With respect to these limited-scope engagements, the following research 
questions are addressed in this study: 
 
9) Is the total number of reported findings a significant predictor of (a) compilation 
report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated 
filing deadlines? 
 
10) Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor 
of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to 
meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
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 11) Is the number of funds reported in the government’s financial  
statements a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) 
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
12) Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the compilation client’s 
office a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
13) Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the 
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) 
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
 This research utilizes ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression to estimate the effects of 
several variables of interest on the time it takes to file the audit report with the Mississippi Office 
of the State Auditor (OSA).  The research also utilizes logistic regression to estimate the effects 
of several variables of interest on the incidence of filing the audit report after the state-mandated 
one-year filing deadline versus filing on time.  OLS regression is also used to estimate the effects 
of several variables of interest on the time it takes to file compilation reports with the state 
auditor, and logistic regression is used to estimate the effects of variables of interest on the 
incidence of filing the compilation report after the state-mandated one-year filing deadline versus 
filing on time.   
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 The majority of the prior studies of governmental audit delay measured audit delay as the 
number of days between the governmental entity’s fiscal year end and the date on the audit 
report.  In this study, audit delay is measured as the number of days between the entity’s fiscal 
year end and the date the audit or compilation was received by the state auditor’s office.  This 
measure is perceived to be superior, as it more closely represents the date in which the reports 
are made available to the public.  The date on the audit report is also subject to manipulation and 
inconsistent interpretation and application of the auditing standards.  Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 103: Audit Documentation, which was effective for audits after December 15, 
2006, affected the dating of the audit report.  According to that Statement, audit reports are to be 
dated no earlier than the date on which the auditor has obtained sufficient appropriate evidence 
to support the opinion.  Sufficient appropriate evidence includes evidence that the documentation 
has been reviewed and that the financial statements have been prepared and that management has 
represented that they have taken responsibility for them.  Prior to this Statement, the date on the 
audit report was made in reference to the end of field work.  This reference now ceases to exist, 
therefore the report date and the release date should be close to each other. 
 In this study, cities and counties required to complete full-scope audits had an average 
time of 312 days from fiscal year end to the date on the audit report versus an average time of 
400 days from fiscal year end to the date the audit report was received by the state auditor’s 
office.  Mississippi entities allowed to complete a compilation engagement had an average time 
of 232 days from fiscal year end to the date on the compilation report versus an average time of 
289 days from fiscal year end to the date the compilation report was received by the state 
auditor’s office.  These figures provide information that the concepts underlying SAS No. 103 
were not consistently applied in Mississippi for fiscal-year 2007.  As such, the time from fiscal 
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year end to the date the report was received by the state auditor’s office is the most appropriate 
measure to use in this study to capture true audit report delay. 
Data used in the study will include all county and municipal audit reports filed in 
Mississippi for fiscal-year 2007, with the exception of audits completed by the OSA.  Fiscal-year 
2007 was chosen because it was the most recent year in which substantially all the audit reports 
were completed and available for examination. 
 
Results 
The results of the study indicate that the area of report message content and managerial 
competency plays an important role in audit report and compilation report timeliness.  In this 
area, financial statement ratios, measuring financial position and performance; the number of 
audit findings; and the type of audit opinion were examined.  Each was found to have some 
relation to report timeliness. 
An examination of two key financial statement ratios in the study revealed somewhat 
conflicting results.  The financial position of the entity, as reflected by the ratio of total net assets 
to total revenues, was not significantly associated with audit delay.  Interestingly, an examination 
of the financial performance of the entity, as reflected by the ratio of the change in net assets to 
total revenues, revealed an association with longer audit delay, which was opposite of the 
direction predicted.  This relationship was significant but was influenced by an outlying 
observation.  When the outlier was removed from the model, the relationship was no longer 
statistically significant.  The findings regarding these ratios warrant future research regarding 
their effect on audit timeliness. 
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The number of audit findings, a variable that has been previously unexamined in 
municipal audit delay, was significant in explaining audit delay.  A higher number of audit 
findings was associated with longer reporting delays as well as with late audits.  Further 
examination into this area revealed evidence that the quantity of findings influenced audit report 
timing to a greater degree than did the materiality of those findings.  The number of findings was 
also significantly associated with longer delays for compilation reports as well as with late 
compilation reports. 
Entities receiving an adverse or qualified opinion were significantly associated with 
longer audit delays as well as with late audits.  The majority of the prior studies of governmental 
audit delay (Dwyer & Wilson, 1989; Rubin, 1992; and McClelland & Giroux, 2000) did not find 
a significant association between the audit opinion and audit delay.  Payne & Jenson (2002), 
however, found that a qualified audit opinion was significantly associated with longer delays.  
The finding in this study is consistent with Payne & Jenson (2002) and provides further evidence 
to support their finding. 
 The government’s level of accountability was found to be less associated with report 
timeliness.  In that area, the research examined the amount of long-term debt held by the 
governmental entity as well as whether the entity was required to report according to the 
requirements of the Single Audit Act.  A greater amount of long-term debt carried by the entity 
was not found to be associated with shorter audit delays but was found to be somewhat 
associated with audits filed within the state-mandated one-year window.  The amount of long-
term debt was not significantly related to shorter delays or timely reports for entities preparing 
compilation reports.  Governmental entities required to report in accordance with the 
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requirements of the Single Audit Act were not found to have had shorter audit delays nor were 
they found to have reported in a timely manner because of the increased accountability.   
 The audit environment was found to play an important role in audit report and 
compilation report timeliness.  In that area, the research examined the total number of funds 
reported by the entity, the travel distance between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s 
office, and the level of expertise of the auditor.   
The number of major funds was not significantly associated with longer audit reporting 
delays or late audits.  When the variable was recoded as a categorical variable similar to prior 
research (coded 0 if the entity reported three or fewer major funds and 1 if the entity reported 
greater than three funds), the number of major funds was still not associated with longer audit 
reporting delays but was somewhat associated with late audits.  The number of funds was not 
associated with longer compilation reporting delays or late compilations.   
 Results of the study provided evidence that the travel distance between the auditor’s 
office and the audit client’s office, a variable that has not previously been examined in prior 
studies of governmental audit delay, plays a role in audit timeliness.  For full-scope audit 
engagements, a greater travel distance was not associated with longer audit delay but was 
associated with late audit filings, particularly when entities that represented their audit firm’s 
only governmental attestation client were removed from the sample.  Travel distance played a 
more important role with compilation engagements.  Travel distance was significantly associated 
with compilation report delay and was associated, to a lesser degree, with late compilation 
reports. 
 The auditor’s expertise, as measured by the total number of governmental attestation 
engagements the firm completed for the fiscal year, had no significant association with audit 
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report delay or with late audits.  For compilations, some evidence was observed that indicated 
that auditor expertise led to shorter compilation report delay.  Auditor expertise was not found to 
have a significant relationship with late versus timely compilations. 
 In the model for full-scope audits, a control variable was included coded 0 if the 
government was a municipality and 1 if the government was a county.  Consistent with findings 
from prior research (Johnson 1998), counties in this study were associated with significantly 
longer reporting delays when compared with municipalities.  Counties were also significantly 
associated with late audits.   
 As previously mentioned, prior studies of governmental audit delay measured delay as 
the number of days between the entity’s fiscal year end and the date on the audit report.  The 
findings from this study were based on the measurement of audit delay as the number of days 
between the entity’s fiscal year end and the date the report was received by the state auditor’s 
office.  This measure is deemed to be superior since it more closely captures the time in which 
reports will be made available to the public and is less subject to manipulation and inconsistent 
application of the auditing standards.  For purposes of comparison, the OLS and logistic 
regressions from this study were also completed after measuring delay consistent with prior 
research.  These results yielded some inconsistencies regarding the variables in the model when 
compared with the results from the model in which delay was measured as the number of days 
between fiscal year end and the date in which the reports were received by the state auditor’s 
office.  This indicates that the method in which audit report delay is defined can influence the 
findings regarding variables perceived to affect audit delay. 
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Importance of the Research 
Figure 1 presents a histogram illustrating the frequencies in which Mississippi 
governments completing full-scope audits for fiscal-year 2007 filed those audits during certain 
ranges of time with the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor.  The most populated category in 
the histogram is the window of time from 366 days to 400 days.  This indicates that many 
governments in Mississippi missed the filing deadline by approximately a month or less.  With a 
better understanding of the factors that affect audit timeliness, these entities may better be able to 
decrease reporting time and avoid the ramifications of the newly established consequences set 
forth in the Mississippi Municipal Audit Guide. 
 
Figure 1: Frequencies in Which Full-Scope Audit Reports Were Submitted to the Mississippi Office of 
the State Auditor for Fiscal-year 2007 
 
 
The findings from this study are important not only to governmental entities but also to 
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granting agencies, that use governmental financial statement information.  Governmental entities 
desiring a more timely audit for any reason, such as the desire to obtain grant monies, can use the 
information to help determine if selection of an auditor with different characteristics than their 
current auditor might aid in timeliness.  The study may also highlight areas of potential 
improvement within the governmental entity that might aid in audit timeliness.   
For governmental auditors concerned with audit timeliness, this study may provide 
information concerning client-specific attributes that affect the timeliness of completing the 
audit.  Knowledge of these variables may help these auditors in determining whether to accept a 
certain audit client for a future engagement and whether that engagement may be completed in a 
timely manner.  As parties become more aware of the types of variables that influence audit 
timing, steps can be taken to improve overall timeliness. 
 Also, as previously mentioned, Mississippi is taking new steps, effective July 2010, to 
help ensure that future timeliness will be enhanced.  The current study examines reporting 
timeliness for fiscal-year 2007, before these new steps were taken.  As such, the findings from 
this study will provide a reference point for a future study concerning the success of these steps 
after they have been instituted in Mississippi.  This study is an important first step in determining 
whether “the goal of increasing the availability of timely information has been hampered by the 
absence of a filing deadline” (NFMA 1998).   
 
Contributions of the Study 
 This study adds to the existing literature in a number of ways.  A major contribution of 
this study is that it is the first study of governmental audit delay to examine differences between 
entities that file audits in a timely manner versus entities that fail to meet audit reporting 
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deadlines.  The study measures audit delay as the time between fiscal year end and the date the 
report is received by the state auditor’s office.  This measure more closely captures the time in 
which the reports are made available to the public.  The study also illustrates that the effects of 
some variables differ depending on whether audit delay is measured as the time between fiscal 
year end and the date on the audit report (as most prior studies have measured delay) or the time 
between fiscal year end and the date the report is received by the state auditor’s office.  Another 
major contribution is that this is the first study to examine reporting delay for governmental 
entities required only to submit a compilation report in lieu of completing and submitting a full-
scope audit report. 
Also, since the most recent empirical study of audit timeliness in local governments 
(McLelland & Giroux 2000) examined data from fiscal year 1996, this is the first empirical study 
that has considered timeliness following the enactment of GASB Statement No. 34.  
Additionally, prior studies (Dwyer & Wilson, 1989; Rubin, 1992; Johnson, 1996; Johnson, 1998; 
McLelland & Giroux, 2000; Johnson et al., 2002; Payne & Jenson, 2002) have only considered 
municipalities with populations greater than 5,000.  The majority (approximately 79 percent) of 
the populations of municipalities in Mississippi fall below 5,000.  This study also includes 
several variables expected to influence governmental audit delay that prior studies have not 
considered.  These include financial statement ratios measuring financial position and 
performance, audit findings, number of reported major funds, and travel distance between the 
auditor’s office and the audit client’s office.   
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Limitations of the Study 
The expected results of this study are subject to some important limitations.  The sample 
for this study was not randomly obtained but instead uses data from counties and municipalities 
from one state.  As such, caution should be used in generalizing these results to other geographic 
regions.  Also, the smaller populations of the observations in this study are not comparable to the 
larger populations of the samples examined in prior studies.  Since this study examines several 
variables not addressed in prior studies, the findings regarding those variables may not be 
generalizable to entities with larger populations. 
In logistic regression, a rule of thumb states that about ten events per variable are 
necessary in order to get reasonably stable estimates of the regression coefficients (Peduzzi et al. 
1996).  The logistic regression model for full-scope-audit entities in the study has about seven 
events per variable.  Although more recent research has concluded that the “Rule of Ten” can be 
relaxed (Vittinghoff & McCulloch 2006), an increased sample size in this study could have 
possibly led to different conclusions. 
Finally, the explanatory power of the OLS model for the full-scope-audit entities in this 
study compares quite favorably to the models used in prior studies.  The explanatory model of 
the OLS model for compilation entities, however, is weaker in comparison.  Future research will 
be warranted to gain a better understanding of those areas that influence delay for these types of 
engagements. 
 
Organization 
 The following chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows.  Chapter Two 
includes a literature review of prior empirical work related to governmental audit delay.  Chapter 
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Three states the research questions and summarizes the methodologies used to analyze the 
variables that impact audit delay and the variables that differ between entities filing audits within 
the specified time period versus the entities that fail to file in a timely manner.  Chapter Four 
explains the results of the dissertation, and Chapter Five summarizes the conclusions and 
limitations of this study. 
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CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Several studies have addressed the issue of audit delay as it relates to governmental 
entities.  Each study established audit delay, measured as the number of days from the 
governmental entity’s fiscal year end to the date on the audit report, as the dependent variable 
and utilized ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression to gather evidence about the effects of a 
number of independent variables.  Beginning with Dwyer & Wilson (1989), each study 
incorporated different combinations of independent variables, often removing some of the 
variables from the prior studies, retaining others, and adding new variables not considered in 
prior studies. 
 
Prior Research on Audit Delay in Local Governments 
It is important to note the differences in sample characteristics across each of the prior 
studies of governmental audit delay before the studies are examined in detail.  Key 
characteristics and mean audit report delay for each previous study are summarized in Table 1.  
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) investigated a sample of 142 cities for fiscal year 1982 and developed 
an explanatory model of reporting timeliness based on incentives for management signaling, the 
message contained within the annual report, and regulatory and technological constraints.  Rubin 
(1992) examined 79 Ohio cities with populations greater than 10,000 for fiscal year 1986 and 
assessed the differences in audit fees charged and audit timeliness between state and private-
sector auditors.  Johnson (1996) examined 192 comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs) 
of cities with populations greater than 50,000.  That study built on the prior literature by 
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Table 1 - Prior Studies of Local Government Audit Delay 
          
    Fiscal Sample Mean Audit 
Study n Year Characteristics Report Lag 
Dwyer and 142 1982 U.S. cities with available 3.56 months 
Wilson,      time series bond data; (approx. 
1989     Population > 25,000 107 days) 
Rubin, 79 1986 Ohio cities; 8.13 months 
1992     Population > 10,000 (approx. 
        244 days) 
Johnson,  192 1993 U.S. cities with CAFRs; 115 days 
1996     Population > 50,000   
          
Johnson,  289 1993 U.S. cities with CAFRs 121 days 
1998     and U.S. counties   
      Population > 20,000   
McLelland 164 1996 U.S. cities; 125 days 
and Giroux,     Population > 100,000   
2000         
Johnson et al., 302 1993 U.S. cities with CAFRs 122 days 
2002     and U.S. counties   
      Population > 20,000   
Payne and 410 1992 Cities in eight states; 100 days 
Jenson,     Population > 5,000 or   
2002     Expenditures > $100,000   
Merritt, 450 2007- U.S. cities issuing bonds 168 days 
2010 250 2009 U.S. counties issuing bonds 172 days 
          
Mead, 294 2006- Largest U.S. cities 182 days 
2011 276 2008 Largest U.S. counties 172 days 
  130   Cities: Revenues between $10 million 187 days 
      and $100 million   
  131   Counties: Revenues between $10 million 244 days 
      and $100 million   
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examining fiscal-year 1993 data, which addressed developments in governmental financial 
reporting since the early 1980s, and it included additional variables not included in the prior 
studies.  Johnson (1998) examined 289 CAFRs of local governments with populations of 20,000 
or more for fiscal year 1993 and extended prior research by considering additional explanatory 
variables and by comparing city and county audit delay.  McLelland & Giroux (2000) examined 
164 cities with populations greater than 100,000 for fiscal year 1996.  Johnson et al. (2002) 
examined 302 cities and counties for fiscal year 1993 and provided further evidence on the effect 
of seasonal variations in auditor workload on audit fees and audit delay.  Payne & Jenson (2002) 
examined 410 cities with populations greater than 5,000 (or expenditures greater than $100,000) 
for fiscal year 1992 and investigated the effects of auditor and auditee characteristics on audit 
delay.  Merritt (2010) was a descriptive study of audits of 250 counties and 450 cities that issued 
municipal bonds, using data from 2007 to 2009.  Mead (2011) examined audits of the largest 
counties and largest cities in the United States, as well as randomly selected local governments 
for fiscal years 2006 to 2008.  The study compared actual audit delay to survey results 
concerning the usefulness of the reported information with the passage of time. 
 
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) 
 Dwyer & Wilson (1989) developed and tested hypotheses related to municipal reporting 
timeliness by establishing a model based, in part, on the underlying assumption that timely 
reporting is one means available to municipal officials to signal above-average competence in 
financial management.  Three separate models were tested, each using a different dependent 
variable.  The dependent variables included (1) the time between fiscal year end and audit report 
date (the report-time model), (2) the time between audit report date and the mailing of the 
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financial statements to the state authorities (the mail-time model), and (3) the total time between 
fiscal year end and the mailing date (the total-time model).  Each of the regression models 
included the same independent variables.  The authors developed four hypotheses concerning 
those variables. 
The authors hypothesized an inverse relationship between favorable report message 
content and municipal reporting time delay, arguing that municipal officials may have incentive 
to report promptly when the message to be reported is favorable.  Two proxies were used for 
report message content.  The first was financial viability, measured by the ratio of general fund 
balance to general fund revenues.  The second proxy was the type of auditor opinion.  Some 
support for this hypothesis was observed.  Both variables were significant for the mail-time 
model.  Neither was significant for the report-time model or the total-time model.  
 The authors also hypothesized an inverse relationship between the level of municipal 
officials’ competence and municipal reporting time delay.  Two proxies were used to capture 
professional competence.  The first was an indicator variable, coded 1 if the municipality had a 
professional manager-council form of government.  The authors included this variable, citing 
Evans & Patton (1983), arguing that city managers tend to be non-elected professional 
administrators whose future may depend upon current positive recognition and that 
professionally trained city managers are likely to be more competent.  This variable was not 
significant in any of the models.  The second proxy for professional competence was 
participation in the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) Certificate of 
Conformance Program.  This variable was significant and in the predicted direction in the report-
time model and the total-time model. 
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 The authors hypothesized a positive relationship between technological constraints and 
timeliness of municipal financial reporting.  Four proxies were used to capture technological 
constraints.  The first was whether the auditor completed the audit during their traditional busy 
season, which the authors defined as October 31 to March 31.  This variable was not significant 
in any of the models.  The second was whether the municipality used a private-sector auditor or a 
public-sector (i.e. state) auditor.  The authors argued that the use of a state auditor is often 
associated with longer reporting time.  This variable was significant only in the report-time 
model.  The third was whether the auditing firm assumed responsibility for the annual report 
printing.  The authors stated that when the municipality assumes responsibility for printing the 
annual report, incentives to hurry or delay printing may exist depending on the type of news 
contained within the report.  Conversely, the auditor has no incentive to delay the printing of the 
report.  No significant relationship was observed concerning this variable.  The fourth proxy the 
authors used to capture technological constraints was the natural log of the population of the 
municipality.  This variable was included to capture the effects of transaction volume and 
organizational complexity.  This variable was not significant in any of the models. 
 Finally, Dwyer & Wilson hypothesized that regulatory constraints are positively related 
to the timeliness of municipal financial reporting.  Two proxies were used to capture regulatory 
effects.  The first was whether the municipality was subject to state regulation of accounting, 
such as which type of accounting basis the municipality must use.  Those municipalities that 
were subject to state regulation of accounting were found to have a significantly increased 
reporting delay, as the variable was significant in both the total-time and report-time models.  
The second proxy was whether the municipality was subject to state regulation of reporting, such 
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as a state-regulated reporting deadline.  This variable was moderately significant (p<0.10) in the 
report-time model and was found to decrease reporting delay. 
 In summary, Dwyer & Wilson’s findings provide evidence that a municipality’s financial 
viability, a clean audit opinion, and participation in the GFOA Certificate Program may all be 
associated with decreased audit report time.  In contrast, some evidence is presented that use of a 
state auditor rather than an independent auditor and state regulation of accounting may lead to 
increased audit reporting time. 
 
Rubin (1992) 
 Rubin (1992) assessed the differences in audit fees charged and the differences in audit 
timeliness between state and private-sector auditors.  The author used audit time as the 
dependent variable, which was measured as the time between fiscal year end and the audit report 
date.  Ten independent variables were used, four of which were used in Dwyer & Wilson (1989) 
and six that were new to that study. 
 The author’s main variable of interest was that of auditor type (private-sector auditor 
versus state auditor).  The other independent variables included (1) the natural log of population, 
(2) debt per capita, (3) bond rating, (4) whether the municipality issued a Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Report rather than a general purpose report, (5) the service index, (6) the number of 
reports issued, (7) whether the municipality was a member of the GFOA, (8) whether the 
municipality obtained the Certificate of Achievement in Financial Reporting, and (9) the type of 
audit opinion.  The author suggested that debt per capita and a higher bond rating may induce 
faster reporting.  Organization complexity, which may require more audit time, was measured by 
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a service index.  Reporting complexities were also measured by the number of distinct reports 
the auditors prepared and whether the report was a CAFR. 
 Auditor type was the only significant variable Rubin observed.  Private-sector auditors 
were found to be associated with shorter audit reporting time.  The author suggested that the 
auditor-type variable may have captured a number of underlying constructs, therefore the 
regression was computed again after dropping that variable from the model.  Results of this 
regression indicated that the attainment of the Certificate of Achievement for Financial 
Reporting is associated with shorter audit reporting time.  These results, as well as the finding 
concerning auditor type, were consistent with the findings of Dwyer & Wilson (1989). 
 
Johnson (1996) 
  Dwyer & Wilson (1989) was based on data from 1982, and Rubin (1992) was based on 
data from 1986.  Johnson (1996) added to the literature by considering data from fiscal year 1993 
in order to address developments in governmental financial reporting since the mid-1980s.  The 
number of days from fiscal year end to the audit report date was used as the dependent variable.  
Ten independent variables were used, including seven that had not been previously tested.  Seven 
hypotheses were developed based on those new variables. 
 The author hypothesized that Big-Six audit firms would perform a more timely audit, 
since those firms can support the concentration of resources to complete an audit on an 
accelerated timetable.  This hypothesis was not supported.  Big-Six audit firms were not found to 
have completed municipal audits significantly more quickly than any other type of audit firm. 
 The author included as a variable the scope of the audit that was performed.  The author 
clarified by stating that, at management’s discretion, the auditor will opine on (1) the combined 
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financial statements and the combining and individual fund statements explicitly (a “full-scope” 
audit report) or (2) the combined financial statements only but assume “in relation to” 
responsibility for the fair presentation of the combining and individual fund statements.  
Expression of a full-scope audit was not found to be significantly related to audit delay.  The 
author also hypothesized that the delay in the audit is directly related to the number of 
component units that exist in the municipal entity.  This hypothesis also was not supported. 
 The author also considered whether there existed a division of responsibility between 
more than one auditor.  The author hypothesized that, due to the potential for problems in 
coordinating efforts, municipalities for which the auditor’s report indicated a division of 
responsibility with other auditors sustain a greater delay in the audit.  Results of the regression 
supported this hypothesis. 
 Dwyer & Wilson (1989) examined timeliness as it related to the traditional busy season 
of the auditor.  Johnson (1996) further examined this issue by redefining “busy season”.  Dwyer 
& Wilson (1989) defined busy season as occurring between October 31 and March 31. Johnson 
(1996) considered busy season to relate to municipalities having any year end other than 
September 30 and hypothesized that audit delay is less for municipalities with that year end.  
Regression results supported that cities with September 30 fiscal year ends experience minimal 
audit delay. 
 Johnson (1996) also considered the tenure of the auditor with the specific municipality 
and hypothesized a negative relationship between auditor tenure and audit delay.  This variable 
was measured as 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, or 5 or more years.  This variable was not 
significant in explaining audit delay. 
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 Finally, the author hypothesized that audit fees per capita are related to municipal audit 
delay.  The author stated that since it is possible that audit delay and audit fees may be jointly 
endogenous, models of audit delay and fees per capita were estimated using two-stage least 
squares.  The estimated models revealed that audit fees do not significantly explain delay, but 
delay does significantly explain fees per capita.  
 Johnson (1996) used as control variables (1) the receipt of the Certificate of Achievement 
for Financial Reporting, (2) the natural log of population, and (3) whether the municipality has a 
city-manager form of government.  Each of these variables was used in prior studies of 
municipal audit timeliness.   In contrast to both Dwyer & Wilson (1989) and Rubin (1992), 
Johnson (1996) found that receipt of the Certificate of Achievement does not significantly 
explain delay.  Similar to both of these prior studies, Johnson (1996) found no significant 
relationship between the natural log of population and audit delay.  The city-manager variable 
also was not significant as was similarly observed in the prior studies. 
 In summary, Johnson (1996) provided evidence that instances where there exists a 
division of auditor responsibility and instances where the municipality has a year end other than 
September 30 correlate with increased audit reporting time.  In contrast to prior studies, Johnson 
provided evidence that the receipt of the Certificate of Achievement for Financial Reporting may 
not significantly correlate with audit delay. 
 
Johnson (1998) 
 As a follow-up to the 1996 study, Johnson (1998) extended the work by considering 
counties in addition to cities.  This study also included additional explanatory variables not 
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considered in prior studies.  Seven independent variables were examined, two of which were new 
to this study. 
 One variable of interest in the Johnson (1998) study was an indicator variable concerning 
whether the audited entity was a city or a county.  Prior studies had not considered whether delay 
differs between the two types of governments.  Johnson suggested that differences in 
organizational characteristics may imply differential delay.  The author noted that cities are 
usually organized such that their various service functions are closely coordinated, and county 
functions are often administered by relatively independent officials.  As a result of the 
comparatively uncoordinated nature of county operations, Johnson expected audit delay to be 
greater for counties.  Regression results supported this assumption. 
 A second variable of interest in the Johnson (1998) study was whether the audit fees were 
based on per-hour charges rather than a fixed amount.  This information was obtained through 
questionnaires submitted to each governmental entity examined in the study.  The author 
expected that under a fixed-fee arrangement, the auditor has incentive to limit the amount of test 
work to a level that would not impair profitability.  In contrast, fees computed on a variable basis 
would provide incentive for the auditors to perform all the audit procedures deemed necessary, 
thus contributing to audit delay.  Regression results provided some evidence to support this 
(p<0.10). 
 Other variables used in Johnson (1998) were (1) whether the entity received the 
Certificate for Achievement in Financial Reporting, (2) whether responsibility for the audit was 
divided among more than one auditor, (3) whether the audited entity had a September 30 fiscal 
year end, (4) whether the state prescribed the scope and nature of the audit, and (5) whether the 
auditor was a public-sector auditor or private-sector auditor.  Consistent with Dwyer & Wilson 
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(1989) and Rubin (1992), but not with Johnson (1996), results of this study provided evidence 
that attainment of the Certificate of Achievement for Financial Reporting is associated with 
decreased audit delay.  Consistent with Johnson (1996), entities with September 30 fiscal year 
ends are associated with decreased audit delay, while division of auditor responsibility is 
associated with increased delay.  Results of this study also indicate that state-mandated audit 
procedures are associated with increased audit delay, which are somewhat in contrast to the 
findings of Dwyer & Wilson (1989). 
 
McLelland & Giroux (2000) 
 The major contribution of McLelland & Giroux (2000) is that the study examined 
municipal audit delay for large municipalities.  Their research considered only municipalities 
with populations greater than 100,000.  The study examined 13 independent variables, three of 
which had not been included in prior studies. 
 One variable included in McLelland & Giroux (2000) was an indicator variable 
concerning whether the municipality disclosed single-audit reports in the CAFR.  The authors 
noted that cities could voluntarily include additional audit reports required by federal regulations 
in the annual report and that inclusion of these voluntary reports would represent good news 
associated with clean opinions.  As such, the authors expected this variable to be associated with 
more timely reporting.  Regression results provided evidence to support the authors’ 
assumptions. 
 Another variable included in this study was an indicator variable concerning whether the 
city had a municipal web page that included tourism, as well as general and specific information 
on the city, together with a way to communicate directly with city officials.  Cities in the 
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research sample were considered to have a municipal web page for purposes of the study 
regardless of whether budget information or financial reports were included on the web page.  
The authors noted that previous research had found that organizational productivity is positively 
related to IT investment, therefore they expected the existence of a municipal web page to be 
associated with decreased audit reporting time.  Regression results confirmed the authors’ 
expectations. 
 Since all municipalities in the sample were subject to Single Audit requirements, the 
authors captured differential effects of additional federal regulations by considering the ratio of 
the log of intergovernmental grants to total revenue.  The authors expected cities with high grant 
percentages to have additional regulatory requirements that would require additional audit time.  
The authors found that higher grant percentages are significantly associated with increased audit 
delay. 
 Additional variables used in McLelland & Giroux (2000) included (1) whether the 
municipality issued a CAFR or general-purpose financial statement, (2) whether the municipality 
had a professional manager and obtained the Certificate of Achievement for Financial Reporting, 
(3) whether the auditor reported a clean audit opinion, (4) the municipality’s bond rating, (5) the 
natural log of the city’s population, (6) the number of component units and joint ventures, (7) 
whether the audit was completed by a private-sector auditor or a public-sector auditor, (8) 
whether the municipality’s fiscal year end occurred between October 31 and December 31, (9) 
whether the audit responsibility was shared among more than one auditor, and (10) whether the 
municipality was subject to state-mandated accounting regulations.  Findings for each variable 
were similar to findings from prior studies with one exception.  While Rubin (1992) did not find 
significance concerning the preparation of a CAFR versus a general-purpose financial statement, 
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McLelland & Giroux found that preparation of a CAFR was significantly associated with 
decreased audit time. 
 
Johnson et al. (2002) 
 Johnson et al. (2002) built upon prior studies by focusing on the government’s fiscal year 
end and its effect on audit delay and audit fees.  The research examined CAFRs of municipalities 
with populations greater than 20,000.  Eight variables were considered, one of which had not 
been considered in prior studies of audit delay. 
 The major finding of the study, concerning audit delay, was that governments with June 
and December fiscal year ends sustain equivalent and maximal audit delay, while governments 
with September year ends experience minimal delay.  This finding is consistent with Johnson 
(1996) and Johnson (1998).  Another variable, which was new to this study, was whether the 
municipal finance officer was a certified public accountant (CPA).  The authors found that 
governments with CPAs are significantly associated with decreased audit time. 
 As in prior studies, Johnson et al. (2002) found that governments receiving the GFOA 
Certificate of Achievement experienced significantly less audit delay.  The study also found that 
division of auditor responsibility, variable rather than fixed fee arrangement, and state agency 
influence on the audit are all significantly associated with increased audit delay.  While Johnson 
(1998) found a significant increase in audit delay for the county form of government in 
comparison to the city form, Johnson et al. (2002) did not find a significant relationship. 
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Payne & Jenson (2002) 
 Payne & Jenson (2002) considered cities in eight states in the southeastern United States.  
A major contribution of this study is that it was the first to consider cities with smaller 
populations.  The sample included cities with populations greater than 5,000 or revenues greater 
than $100,000.  The study also discussed whether significant influences on audit delay are 
characteristics of the audit firm or of the audit client, suggesting municipalities can control the 
audit-firm specific characteristics through the audit procurement process. Sixteen variables were 
considered, and hypotheses were developed concerning each variable.  Several variables 
examined in this study had not been considered in prior studies. 
 The authors first hypothesized that a city-manager form of municipal management will 
reduce audit delay.  McLelland & Giroux (2000) had observed this in their study.  Payne & 
Jenson (2002) provided some support for their hypothesis (significant at p<0.10).  In their second 
hypothesis, the authors expected that municipalities receiving the Certificate of Achievement 
will have reduced audit delay.   Consistent with prior studies, the authors found support for this 
hypothesis. 
 A new variable considered by Payne & Jenson (2002) was whether bonded indebtedness 
was present in the government being audited.  Dwyer & Wilson (1989) and McLelland & Giroux 
(2000) had considered bond rating, but none of the studies prior to Payne & Jenson (2002) had 
considered the mere presence of bonded indebtedness, regardless of the rating.  The authors 
expected that the presence of debt would increase monitoring of municipal performance, and 
since delayed audit reporting can increase the perception of bad news, the government officials 
would have incentive to report in a more timely manner.  As such, the authors expected that the 
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presence of bonded indebtedness would be associated with reduced audit delay, and they found 
evidence to support their expectations. 
 The authors next hypothesized that the presence of regulations to prohibit solicitation of 
competitive bidding, the presence of municipal policies to solicit bids for multi-year 
engagements, and the presence of a competitive audit procurement process will all influence 
audit delay.  The authors did not make directional predictions for the three hypotheses 
concerning these three variables.  The results provided evidence that a state ban on solicitation or 
competitive bidding was associated with increased audit delay.  The other two variables were not 
significant in the model. 
 The authors classified the next five hypotheses as being associated with characteristics of 
the municipality rather than the auditor.  The authors expected that large municipalities would 
have increased audit delay.  While prior studies measured municipality size by examining the 
natural log of population, Payne & Jenson (2002) examined municipal expenditures.  Each of the 
prior studies found no significance regarding the association between population and audit delay.  
Payne & Jenson, however, found that municipalities with larger total expenditures experience 
significantly increased audit delay. 
 The second audit-client-specific hypothesis involved the complexity of the audit.  The 
authors measured this by examining whether the audit client has three or more separate funds in 
the financial statements.  They hypothesized that audit clients with more than three funds would 
experience greater audit delay due to increased audit complexity.  Their hypothesis was not 
supported. 
 As in prior studies, the authors hypothesized that audits performed during the auditor’s 
busy season will have increased audit delay.  As in prior studies, the results provided evidence to 
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support this hypothesis.  Payne & Jenson (2002) also hypothesized that financial statements 
issued with a qualified audit opinion will have increased audit delay.  Prior studies had not found 
that the type of audit opinion had any significant relationship with audit delay.  Payne & Jenson, 
however, found that a government receiving a qualified audit opinion is significantly associated 
with increased audit delay. 
 A final audit-client-specific hypothesis Payne & Jenson (2002) examined was whether 
the municipality was required to comply with the Single Audit Act.  This had not been explicitly 
tested in prior studies.  The authors hypothesized that the additional requirements of the Single 
Audit Act would lead to increased audit delay.  Results provided some evidence to support this 
(p<0.10). 
 The final five hypotheses of Payne & Jenson (2002) involved what the authors classified 
as auditor-specific characteristics.  These related to auditor expertise, auditor tenure, division of 
auditor responsibility, the number of employees at the audit firm, and auditor size.  Auditor 
expertise was measured by whether the auditor performed two or more municipal audits.   The 
authors expected auditor expertise to be inversely related to audit delay.  This hypothesis was 
supported, thus providing evidence concerning a variable not previously examined in the studies 
preceding Payne & Jenson (2002). 
 Auditor tenure with the audit client was not found to be significantly related to audit 
delay.  In contrast to prior studies, division of auditor responsibility was not found to be 
significant in their model.  The number of employees at the audit firm that performed the audit, a 
variable not previously tested, was found to be significantly associated with audit delay.  A 
larger number of audit employees was associated with decreased audit delay.  As in prior studies, 
the use of a Big-Six audit firm was not found to be significantly associated with audit delay. 
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Merritt Research Services (2010) 
 Merritt Research Services is an independent research and data provider focused on credit 
information related to municipal bonds.  In a 2010 study, the organization examined audits on 
different municipal bond entities, spanning a three-year period from 2007 to 2009. Findings from 
that study indicated that the average time spent by counties to compete their 2009 fiscal year 
audits was 172.3 days.  Approximately 205 counties were included in the sample for the study.  
Cities were slightly faster, taking an average of 167.7 days.  Approximately 450 cities were 
included in the sample.  The study noted that credit quality was not necessarily a factor in how 
fast or slow the audit was completed, however, weaker or more distressed credits were often 
found to be on the list of late audits. 
 
Mead (2011) 
 The Governmental Accounting Standards Board issued a Research Brief addressing how 
long it takes governments to issue financial reports prepared in conformity with GAAP and how 
the passage of time affects the usefulness of financial report information for decision making.  
The GASB reviewed financial reports for fiscal years 2006-2008 of the 100 largest counties 
(based on population) and the 100 largest localities and 50 randomly selected smaller county 
governments (ranging from $10 million to $100 million in annual revenues) and 50 smaller city 
governments.  While all prior studies measured audit report delay as the time between the fiscal 
year end and the date of the auditor’s report, the Mead (2011) study measures delay as the time 
between fiscal year end and the date of the letter of transmittal. 
39 
 
 Results from the study indicated that the mean audit delay for all counties in the sample 
was 243.89 days, while the mean audit delay for localities was 187.06 days.  A comparison of 
large counties to small counties provided evidence that smaller counties experience a greater 
audit delay, with larger counties experiencing a mean of 172.17 days versus 243.89 days for 
smaller counties.  A comparison of larger and smaller localities indicated a slightly greater 
amount of delay for smaller localities (187.06 days) versus larger localities (181.70 days).  
 In addition to gathering data concerning report timing, the GASB also surveyed users of 
governmental financial information (bond analysts, citizen/taxpayer groups, and 
legislative/oversight staff) concerning the usefulness of the financial information with the 
passage of time.  Findings showed that the passage of time diminishes the usefulness of financial 
information.  While 88 percent of respondents considered information received within 45 days of 
fiscal year end to be “very useful”, the proportion was halved to 43 percent for information 
received within three months.  Less than nine percent of respondents considered information 
received within six months to be “very useful”.  Over half of the respondents considered 
information received after 12 months to be “not useful at all”. 
 
Significant Variables from Prior Research of Audit Delay in Local Governments 
 The studies included in the literature review each used OLS regression to determine the 
effect of several explanatory variables on audit report delay.  They also used a wide variety of 
data from large cities and counties and entities issuing bonds to small cities and counties.  Table 
2 summarizes the variables found in those studies to be significantly associated with audit report 
delay.  The current study differs from those reviewed in that it considers all counties and cities in 
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a specific state, regardless of size characteristics and other limiting characteristics, such as 
issuance of bonds or reporting using a CAFR. 
 
Table 2: Variables Prior Studies Have Shown to be Significantly Associated  
with Audit Delay 
    
Decreases Increases 
Audit Delay Audit Delay 
Receipt of GFOA Certificate of Achievement Audit responsibility divided among two 
for Excellence in Financial Reporting 
a, b, d, e, f, g
 or more auditors 
c, d, e, f
 
Preparation of CAFR rather than Municipal year end coincides with  
general purpose financial statements 
e, g
 auditor's busy season 
c, d, f, g
 
Government finance officer is a certified Variable rather than fixed fee 
public accountant 
f
 arrangement with auditor 
f
 
Auditor is experienced in governmental Large amount of municipal expenditures 
audits 
g
 for the fiscal year 
g
 
City-form of government rather than Presence of state-mandated accounting 
other form of government 
d
 or auditing requirements 
a, d
 
Larger number of employees at audit firm State ban on solicitation or competitive 
that performs the audit 
g
 bidding for audit engagements 
g
 
Presence of bonded indebtedness 
g
 Use of public-sector (state) auditor rather 
  than private-sector auditor 
a, b, e
 
Governmental entity has a web page 
e
 Total revenue is made up of a larger portion 
       of intergovernmental revenue 
e
 
Governmental entity voluntarily includes Auditor issued a qualified audit opinion 
g
 
additional reports 
e
   
  a Dwyer & Wilson (1989) 
 b Rubin (1992) 
 c Johnson (1996) 
 d Johnson (1998) 
 e McLelland & Giroux (2000) 
 f Johnson et al. (2002) 
 g Payne & Jenson (2002) 
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Prior Research of Audit Delay in School Districts 
 Also pertinent to this research are the findings of Carslaw et al. (2007) in a study of audit 
delay in school districts.  In that study, the authors examined results from 36,367 audits during 
the five-year period from 1998 to 2002.  The authors noted an average audit delay of anywhere 
from 245 days to 432 days in the five years analyzed and also noted that the percent of late filers 
ranged from 9.7 percent to 15.6 percent. 
 In all five years examined, the authors noted that audit delay was positively associated 
with the level of expenditures for the year.  Other variables that were found to have significantly 
increased audit delay in all five years of the study include the use of a sole-practitioner auditor 
rather than a larger firm, the presence of reportable conditions in the audit report, and the 
presence of material noncompliance in the audit report.  The authors also noted that the use of a 
private-sector auditor rather than the use of a state auditor was associated with decreased audit 
delay in all five years analyzed in the study. 
 In four of the five years studied, the authors found that an audit report with an unqualified 
audit opinion was associated with decreased audit delay.  In three of the five years examined, 
receipt of the GFOA certificate of achievement, the auditor’s experience in similar audit 
engagements, and the classification of the audit client as a low-risk client, were all significantly 
associated with decreased audit delay. 
 The study also focused attention on the effects of the results of the Single Audits on audit 
delay.  In three of the five years, the issuance of an unqualified opinion on the report of major 
programs was found to be significantly related to a decrease in audit delay.  The remainder of the 
findings was mixed.  The presence of questioned costs on the audit report significantly increased 
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audit delay in one of the years, while it significantly decreased audit delay in another year.  A 
similar result was noted regarding the presence of reportable conditions in a major program. 
 
Prior Research of Audit Delay in For-Profit Entities 
 Researchers have been examining audit delay in for-profit companies since as early as the 
1970s.  Because of the differing characteristics between for-profit companies versus 
governmental entities, many of the findings from these studies are not applicable to a study of 
audit delay in governments.   Some findings from prior studies of audit delay in for-profit 
companies that are relevant to this study are discussed below. 
 The most consistent finding among the prior studies is that the size of the company is 
negatively associated with audit delay.  It could be reasoned that larger clients require more audit 
work as a result of complexity and a comparably higher number of transactions.  It could also, 
however, be expected that these larger companies would have more in-house expertise and better 
internal controls, which would result in a reduction of audit work (Newton & Ashton, 1989).  At 
least 11 prior studies of audit delay (Courtis, 1976; Davies & Whittred, 1980; Givoly & Palmon, 
1982; Newton & Ashton, 1989; Ashton et al., 1989; Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Bamber et al., 
1993; Ng & Tai, 1994; Schwartz & Soo, 1996; Jaggi & Tsui, 1999; Owusu-Ansah, 2000) found 
that larger companies (often measured by total assets or by total revenues) have a shorter audit 
delay.  This finding is also consistent with the idea that larger companies have a greater incentive 
for timely disclosure of results, as these companies face greater external pressure to report 
earnings quickly (Newton & Ashton, 1989; Bamber et al., 1993).  Of particular importance is the 
finding from Ashton et al. (1989) that larger, publicly traded companies are associated with 
significantly shorter audit delay, while larger, non-public companies are associated with 
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significantly longer audit delay.  This result suggests that incentive for timely disclosure is an 
underlying factor regarding the association of entity size with audit delay. 
 Audit-delay research in for-profit companies has also yielded important information 
regarding the effect of profitability measures on the length of time to completion of the audit.  
Findings from prior studies appear to confirm that the reporting of bad news tends to be delayed, 
while the reporting of favorable news tends to be accelerated (Givoly & Palmon, 1982; 
Chambers & Penman, 1984; Atiase et al. 1989).  Ashton et al. (1989), Bamber et al. (1993), 
Schwartz & Soo (1996), Henderson & Kaplan (2000), and Krishnan (2005) all found that a 
company with a loss before extraordinary items was significantly more likely to be associated 
with increased audit delay, and Courtis (1976) found that as a company’s profitability increases, 
audit delay decreases.  Similarly, Newton & Ashton (1989) and Ng & Tai (1994) each found that 
an increased percentage change in earnings from the previous year leads to a decrease in audit 
delay.  Bamber et al. (1993), in examining both audit report delay and earnings announcement 
delay, found that an increased percentage change in earnings from the previous year did not lead 
to decreased audit delay but did lead to decreased delay in earnings announcement.  This finding 
provides strong evidence that companies wish to speed up the reporting of favorable news. 
 Prior studies examined not only the effects of measures of company profitability, but also 
the effects of measures of financial condition.  Bamber et al. (1993) computed a financial 
condition index which measures a company’s probability of bankruptcy.  Findings indicated that 
as the probability of bankruptcy increased, the audit delay also increased.  Henderson & Kaplan 
(2000) also found that as the probability of bankruptcy increased, so did the audit report delay.  
Davies & Whittred (1980) determined that a higher ratio of debt to total assets was associated 
with increased audit delay. 
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 Another area of focus for prior studies of audit delay in for-profit companies is that of 
various complexities that may be inherent in a particular audit or may arise during the course of 
an audit.  At least six prior studies (Newton & Ashton, 1989; Ashton et al., 1989; Bamber et al., 
1993; Schwartz & Soo, 1996; Laitinen & Laitinen, 1998; and Henderson & Kaplan, 2000) all 
found that increased audit delay occurs with the presence of extraordinary items on the audit 
client’s financial statements.  Ng & Tai (1994) and Jaggi & Tsui (1999) found that an increased 
number of company subsidiaries was followed by an increase in audit delay.  Ashton et al. 
(1989) found that audit delay increased for companies with a greater number of reported 
contingencies, and Henderson & Kaplan (2000) noted that audit delay increased for companies 
with uncertainties cited in the audit report. 
 Research has also examined the effect of a certain type of audit opinion on the ultimate 
delay of the audit report.  While Ashton et al. (1989) found that the issuance of a qualified audit 
opinion leads to decreased audit delay, other studies (Bamber et al., 1993; Schwartz & Soo, 
1996; Jaggi & Tsui, 1999; and Soltani, 2002) have found the opposite.  Schwartz & Soo (1996) 
found that an audit report with a going-concern explanatory paragraph was associated with 
longer audit delay. 
 While the characteristics of for-profit entities differ from those of governmental entities, 
some of the findings from prior research of corporate audit delay are used to guide the 
hypotheses of this study of governmental audit delay.  The finding concerning a company’s 
desire to accelerate the reporting of good news and delay the reporting of bad news particularly 
helps guide some of the hypotheses in this study regarding report message content.  Research 
Question 1 in this study deals with whether the financial report message, as evidenced by key 
financial statement ratios, is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports 
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meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  Since this area has not been 
examined in prior studies of governmental audit delay, it was necessary to look to the findings 
from corporate audit delay to guide the hypotheses in this study regarding the effect of 
profitability ratios and financial-position ratios on the timing of the audit.  Also, the findings 
from studies of corporate audit delay regarding the effect of various complexities on the timing 
of the audit are also considered when developing the hypotheses regarding the audit environment 
in this study. 
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY 
 This research examines the variables that impact delay in audits of local governments in 
Mississippi, as well as the variables that differ between local governments that file audits within 
the state-mandated deadlines versus those governments that fail to do so.  The research also 
examines the variables that impact delay in compilation reports issued by smaller local 
governments that are not required to complete full-scope audits, as well as the variables that 
differ between local governments that file compilations within the state-mandated deadlines 
versus those governments that fail to do so. 
This research defines audit/compilation delay (DELAY) as the number of days from 
fiscal year end (September 30, 2007 for all observations in this study) to the date the audit or 
compilation report was filed with the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor.
4
  This definition of 
audit delay differs from prior studies of governmental audit delay as discussed in Chapter II in 
that those studies, with the exception of Dwyer & Wilson (1989) and Mead (2011), measured 
audit delay as the time between the fiscal year end and the date on the audit report.  The filing 
date, rather than the report date, is used in this study, because it better represents the time in 
which the reports are publicly available. 
 This research defines a late audit/compilation (LATE) as one that is submitted to the 
Office of the State Auditor on a date beyond the state-mandated audit deadline.  In this study, 
audits that are filed late are coded “1”, while on-time audits are coded “0”.  Concerning the state-
mandated audit deadline, Section 21-35-31 (1) of the Mississippi Code requires all municipalities 
to have an annual audit or compilation.  According to the Code, the procedures shall be 
                                                          
4
 This variable is log transformed for analysis. 
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completed and the reports be submitted to the state auditor’s office before the close of the next 
succeeding fiscal year.  As such, the audit deadline and, therefore, the cutoff date between a late 
audit or compilation and a timely audit or compilation is defined in this research as September 
30, 2008.  
This research utilizes OLS regression to identify the statistically significant variables that 
can be used to predict governmental audit/compilation delay, and it uses logistic regression to 
identify the statistically significant variables that differ between entities that file audits or 
compilations in a timely manner versus those entities that do not file in a timely manner.  In this 
study, report timeliness is modeled on the following factors:  1) Report message content and 
managerial competency, 2) Accountability, and 3) Audit environment.  Specifically, the research 
addresses the following research questions concerning the effect those factors have on the 
completion of full-scope audits: 
 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
1)  Is the financial report message, as evidenced by key financial  
statement ratios, a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
2) Is the total number of reported audit findings a significant predictor of (a) audit 
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines? 
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 3) Is a qualified or adverse audit opinion a significant predictor of (a) audit  
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines? 
 
Accountability: 
 
4) Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor 
of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-
mandated filing deadlines? 
 
5) Is the earlier filing deadline required under the Single Audit Act a significant 
predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet 
state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Audit Environment: 
 
6) Is the number of major funds reported in the government’s financial  
statements a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports 
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
 7) Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office a  
significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or 
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
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8) Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the 
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports 
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Regarding compilation engagements for smaller governments, the research addresses the 
following questions: 
 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
9) Is the total number of reported findings a significant predictor of (a) compilation 
report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated 
filing deadlines? 
 
Accountability: 
10) Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor 
of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to 
meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Audit Environment: 
 11) Is the number of funds reported in the government’s financial  
statements a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) 
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
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12) Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the compilation client’s 
office a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
13) Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the 
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) 
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 The current study proposes that audit/compilation timeliness is a function of three groups 
of factors, as shown in the following model: 
 
Audit/Compilation delay =  ƒ (Report message content and managerial competency, 
Accountability, Audit environment) 
 
 Prior studies of governmental audit delay have also considered regulatory constraints.  
Due to the nature of the sample used in this study (observations from only one state), regulatory 
constraints will be equal across all observations.  Therefore, many of the variables found to be 
significant in prior studies are controlled for by the use of data from only one state.  For example, 
Johnson (1996), Johnson (1998), Johnson et al. (2002), and Payne & Jenson (2002) all found that 
governmental entities with a fiscal year-end falling within the researchers’ defined “busy season” 
were associated with increased audit delay.  All governmental entities in Mississippi have a 
September 30 year end, therefore a control variable to capture year-end differences is not 
included in the regression models for this study.  
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Johnson et al. (2002) found that a variable fee arrangement based on a per-hour charge 
was associated with increased audit delay when compared with audit engagements with a fixed 
fee arrangement.  In Mississippi, a variable fee arrangement exists with the total fee not allowed 
to exceed a contracted fixed amount.  Since all observations in the sample for this study are 
subject to the same type of fee arrangement, a control variable to capture the type of fee 
arrangement is not included in the regression models for this study. 
Payne & Jenson (2002) found that the presence of a state ban on solicitation or 
competitive bidding for audit engagements ultimately leads to increased audit delay.  As no such 
ban exists in Mississippi, all observations in the sample for this study will be equal for this 
variable.  As such, a control variable to capture differences in state policies regarding solicitation 
or competitive bidding for audit engagements is not included in the regression models in this 
study. 
Finally, Dwyer & Wilson (1989) and McLelland & Giroux (2000) each found that the 
presence of state-mandated accounting requirements can impact audit timeliness.  Dwyer & 
Wilson (1989) found that if a state was subject to state regulation of accounting, such as when a 
state requires an accounting basis other than that required by GAAP, this is associated with 
increased audit delay.  Similarly, McLelland & Giroux (2000) found that the presence of state 
accounting regulations increased audit report delay.  In Mississippi, the accounting requirements, 
and thus the auditing requirements, depend on the amount of municipal revenues or 
expenditures. 
According to the state’s municipal audit guide, Mississippi municipal governments may 
contract for one of three different types of engagements:  (1) Full-scope audit of financial 
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, (2) Full-scope audit of financial statements 
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prepared in accordance with Other Comprehensive Basis of Accounting (OCBOA) (i.e. Cash 
Basis), or (3) The preparation of a compilation report using OCBOA (Cash Basis) after applying 
certain agreed-upon procedures.   
The criteria to determine the type of attestation engagement is based on total revenues or 
expenditures, whichever is greater.  All municipalities with revenues or expenditures greater than 
or equal to $10 million are required to have a full-scope audit of financial statements prepared in 
accordance with GAAP and report in accordance with GASB Statement No. 34.  All 
municipalities with total revenues or expenditures greater than or equal to $1 million but less 
than $10 million are required to have a full-scope audit of their Combined Statement of Cash 
Receipts and Disbursements and report in accordance with GASB Statement No. 34.  
Municipalities with revenues or expenditures less than $1 million may contract for a compilation 
report in lieu of a full-scope audit of financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP.  
Since the single audit package that must be submitted to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse 
requires audited financial statements, the option for a compilation report is not available if the 
municipality is required to have a federal single audit. 
Since all the observations in this study are subject to the same regulatory constraints, a 
control variable to capture differences in state regulations is not included in the regression 
models.  However, since each of the report choices will require differing amounts of auditor 
effort and the auditor’s output will differ between the two types of engagements, separate 
regression models are completed for full-scope audits and for compilation reports/agreed-upon 
procedures engagements.  Due to the small number of Mississippi municipalities having full-
scope audits of financial statements that are prepared in accordance with OCBOA, separate 
regressions are not completed for those engagements.  Furthermore, since the characteristics of 
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those engagements differ from the characteristics of either a full-scope-audit engagement or a 
compilation engagement, those entities are not included in the regression models in this study. 
 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) developed hypotheses based on the premise that timely reporting 
is a device employed by municipalities to signal highly competent financial management.  
Administrators and elected officials are expected to signal fiscal competence and stewardship to 
the citizens, investors, and other users (McLelland & Giroux 2000).  One circumstance in which 
management has incentive to signal competent performance is when there exists a favorable 
message to be reported.  One element of a favorable message is strong financial performance.  
Givoly & Palmon (1982) noted that delayed financial reporting is often a precursor to the receipt 
of bad news.  Hirshleifer (1993) suggested that managers’ incentives are to advance the arrival of 
good news and delay the arrival of bad news. 
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) proxied strong financial performance with a measure of 
financial viability (the ratio of the general fund balance to general fund revenues).  The ratio of 
general fund balance to general fund revenues is a widely used indicator of operating fund 
liquidity (Dwyer & Wilson 1989).  In the prior studies of municipal audit timeliness, this is the 
only ratio that has thus far been examined, and the researchers did not find evidence that it was 
significantly associated with audit delay.  The current study proposes to examine other key 
governmental financial statement ratios as suggested by Pridgen & Wilder (2011) to be relevant 
indicators of underlying debt ratings.  Those ratios include the following: 
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(1) Total Net Assets / Total Revenues 
(2) Change In Net Assets / Total Net Assets 
 
 Equation (1) is a measure of financial position (POSITION).  It measures the extent to 
which cumulative revenues exceed cumulative costs.  Equation (2) is a measure of financial 
performance (PERFORMANCE) that measures how much of the current year’s surplus or deficit 
contributed to the cumulative net assets.  These two key financial ratios provide a measure of 
favorable or unfavorable report content.  It is expected that favorable report content (good news) 
will be reported in a more timely manner.  This effect is expected for two reasons.  First, 
management has a signaling incentive to report good news as quickly as possible, as report 
delay, itself, may be interpreted as a signal of bad news.  Also, favorable report content is an 
indication of competent management.  A competent management staff is expected to have 
stronger internal controls and a more extensive and well-organized record-keeping function.  
These characteristics will aid the audit process, have a positive impact on the auditor’s 
assessment of risk, and contribute to a more timely audit.  In contrast, it is expected that the 
reporting of unfavorable content (bad news) will be delayed and will also be associated with less 
competent management.  A less competent management staff can be reasonably expected to have 
weaker internal controls and a less extensive and more unorganized record-keeping function.  
These characteristics will hinder the audit process, have a negative impact on the auditor’s 
assessment of risk, and contribute to a less timely overall audit.  Based on these arguments, the 
following are hypothesized: 
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H1a:  A favorable report message, as measured by key financial statement ratios, will be 
negatively associated with audit report delay. 
 
H1b: A favorable report message, as measured by key financial statement ratios, will be 
associated with audit reports meeting state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
  Another element of a favorable governmental audit report message is the lack of audit 
findings.  Prior studies of governmental audit timeliness have not addressed audit findings.  In a 
study of differences between private-sector auditors and public-sector (state government) 
auditors in Mississippi, Cagle & Pridgen (2011) noted that the number of audit findings issued in 
the audit report is positively associated with audit delay.  Audit findings are issued when the 
auditee fails to comply with laws or regulations and when the auditor notes problems with 
internal controls.  These issues, especially internal control problems, will lead to increased 
assessment of risk, increased audit procedures, and increased audit time.  In contrast, the lack of 
audit findings, like favorable financial statement ratios, is a measure of good news that is 
expected to be reported in a more timely manner.  Lack of audit findings may also be considered 
an indication of competent management.  In contrast, a large number of audit findings could be 
perceived as bad news and could be an indication of less competent management, both of which 
could lead to less timely reporting.  In this study, FINDINGS is defined as the total number of 
findings issued by the auditor on the audit report.  The following are hypothesized: 
 
H2a: The total number of reported audit findings will be positively associated with audit 
report delay. 
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H2b:  A higher number of reported audit findings will be will be associated with audit 
reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. 
  
 Although prior studies (Dwyer & Wilson 1989, Rubin 1992, McLelland & Giroux 2000) 
have found no significant relationship between the type of audit opinion and audit timeliness, 
Payne & Jenson (2002) found that unqualified audit opinions were significantly associated with 
decreased audit time.  Also, Laitinen & Laitinen (1998) found a significant association between 
qualified audit reports and timeliness of filing by commercial entities.  Bamber et al. (1993) 
suggests that qualified opinions are not likely to be issued until after the auditor has spent 
considerable time and effort pursuing additional audit procedures and other reporting alternatives 
in an effort to avoid qualification.  In this study, the variable OPINION is coded 1 if the 
government entity received an other-than-unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise.  Taking 
into consideration the findings of Payne & Jenson (2002) and Laitinen & Laitinen (1998) and 
that suggested by Bamber et al. (1993), the following are hypothesized: 
 
H3a: An other-than-unqualified audit opinion will be associated with increased audit 
report delay. 
 
H3b: An other-than-unqualified audit opinion will be associated with audit reports failing 
to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
57 
 
The government’s receipt of the GFOA Certificate for Excellence in Financial Reporting, 
a variable included and found to be significant in most of the prior studies on governmental audit 
delay, is not included in this study.  Evans & Patton (1983) noted that larger cities are more 
likely to participate in this award program, and Payne & Jenson (2002) noted that, of the states 
sampled in that study, Mississippi was the least likely to participate in the Certificate program.  
In the year sampled for this study, only five municipalities in Mississippi (Biloxi, Clinton, 
Jackson, Meridian, and Ridgeland) received the Certificate.  These five cities are retained in the 
model, but, as a sensitivity check, a separate regression was calculated after removing these 
cities. 
 Preparation of a comprehensive annual financial report (CAFR) rather than general-
purpose financial statements will also not be considered in this study, as only ten counties and 
cities in Mississippi prepared a CAFR.  Also, a city-manager form of government versus another 
form of government is not considered in this study, as only six entities (D’Iberville, Gautier, 
Grenada, Pascagoula, Pearl River, Picayune) in Mississippi were noted as having a city-manager 
form.  As with the cities awarded the Certificate for Excellence, those cities preparing CAFRs 
and those cities with a city-manager form of government are retained in the model, but, as a 
sensitivity check, separate regressions were computed after removing these entities. 
 
Accountability: 
 Differing levels of accountability may also influence the timing of the audit report.  For 
example, the presence of debt is expected to increase monitoring of municipal performance 
(Evans & Patton 1987).  Bondholders’ primary concerns are the solvency of the municipality and 
its ability to repay the required debt service (Payne & Jenson 2002).  Payne & Jenson (2002) 
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noted that bondholders would view an unusual delay in financial reporting as a negative sign.  As 
such, management of entities in which bonded and other long-term indebtedness exist will have 
an incentive to signal favorable performance through timely reporting.  Payne & Jenson (2002) 
found that the presence of bonded indebtedness significantly reduced audit delay.  In this study, 
the DEBT variable is measured as the total dollar amount of long-term debt at fiscal year end.  
The following are hypothesized: 
 
H4a: The amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness will be negatively associated 
with audit report delay. 
 
H4b: A higher amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness will be associated with 
audit reports meeting state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
 Payne & Jenson (2002) also included a variable capturing whether the government 
reported in accordance with the requirements of the Single Audit Act.  Governments expending 
$500,000 or greater of Federal assistance in a single year are subject to additional audit 
procedures under the Single Audit Act.  These additional procedures will increase audit time, and 
additional audit reports will necessarily be generated.  The single audit reporting package, which 
must be submitted to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse, includes not only the audited financial 
statements, but also a schedule of expenditures of federal awards, the auditor’s opinion on the 
fair presentation of the schedule of federal expenditures of awards, an auditor’s report on internal 
control findings and an opinion on compliance pertaining to major programs, an auditor’s 
schedule of findings and questioned costs, a summary schedule of prior audit findings, a 
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summary of planned and completed corrective actions regarding those findings, and a data 
collection form summarizing the results of each audit (Carslaw et al. 2007).  Payne & Jenson 
(2002) found a marginally significant positive association between the existence of a Single 
Audit and audit delay.   
Although Single Audits lead to additional audit requirements and time, entities subject to 
those requirements are also subject to additional filing deadlines by the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB).  Specifically, the single audit reporting package must be submitted no later 
than nine months after the end of the auditee’s fiscal year.  In this study, the SINGLEAUDIT 
variable is coded 1 if the government is subject to the requirements of the Single Audit Act, and 
0 otherwise.  As a result of the additional level of accountability and the Single Audit filing 
deadline occurring earlier than Mississippi’s state-mandated filing deadline, the following are 
hypothesized: 
 
H5a: Governmental entities subject to the Single Audit Act will be associated with 
decreased audit report delay. 
  
H5b: Governmental entities subject to the Single Audit Act will be associated with audit 
reports meeting state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
Audit Environment: 
 The various complexities of an audit can lead to potential delays in the timing of the audit 
report.  Payne & Jenson (2002) used as a measure of audit complexity the number of separate 
funds reported on the government’s financial statements.  The variable was coded 1 for any 
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entity that reported three or more separate funds and 0 if otherwise.  Approximately 81 percent 
of the observations in that study reported three or more separate funds, and the findings indicated 
no significant correlation with audit timing.  Since that study, the enactment of GASB Statement 
No. 34 changed the method of reporting individual funds.  Current rules require reporting only 
“major funds” separately rather than reporting all funds separately.  Major funds include the 
general fund and any other fund in which total assets, liabilities, revenues, or 
expenditures/expenses of the fund are at least 10 percent of the total of all funds of its category 
(governmental or enterprise) and at least 5 percent of the total for all governmental and 
enterprise funds combined.  All non-major funds are allowed to be combined and reported in a 
single column.   
In the current study, a variable, FUNDS, is included to capture the number of reported 
major funds.  As a greater number of major funds will require a greater amount of audit effort, 
the following are hypothesized: 
 
H6a: The total number of reported major funds will be positively associated with audit 
delay. 
 
H6b: A higher number of reported major funds will be associated with audit reports failing 
to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
 The physical distance between the auditor’s office and the auditee’s office is a variable 
not considered in prior studies.  While the distance between the auditor and client is not a direct 
measure of audit complexity, the mileage the auditors must travel to complete field work can be 
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reasonably expected to have a bearing on the amount of time required to complete the audit.  An 
auditor situated farther from the audit client will require additional travel time that an auditor 
situated nearer to the client would not be required to incur.  Additionally, auditors may be 
inclined to procrastinate concerning engagements in which the burden of increased travel is 
present, especially when there exist other engagements that are closer in proximity.  In this study, 
the DISTANCE variable is defined as the total number of miles between the auditor’s office and 
the auditee’s office.  The following are hypothesized: 
 
H7a: The total number of miles between the auditor and the audit client will be positively 
associated with audit report delay. 
 
H7b: A higher number of miles between the auditor and the audit client will be associated 
with audit reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
  An audit of governmental entities differs from an audit of for-profit companies.  
Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), issued by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), apply to financial and performance audits of governmental 
agencies.  As such, a degree of specialization is required to perform governmental audits.  In this 
study, the variable, EXPERTISE, is measured as the total number of governmental audit and 
compilation clients for each audit firm in the sample.  Audit firms that specialize in audits and 
compilations of governmental entities are expected to be better equipped to perform a timely 
audit or compilation of a local governmental entity.  However, since all governmental 
engagements in Mississippi are due on the same date, auditors with multiple governmental 
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clients may experience time constraints as a result of increased workload.  As such, no direction 
is predicted regarding the following hypotheses: 
 
H8a: The total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the audit 
firm will be associated with audit delay. 
 
H8b: The total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the audit 
firm will be associated with whether audit reports meet state-mandated filing deadlines. 
   
Control Variable: 
The data obtained for this study includes audits of both counties and municipalities.  Each 
of the report choices will require differing amounts of auditor effort.  County audits are expected 
to differ from municipal audits in the organization of operations and the degree of audit 
complexity.  Johnson (1998) included a categorical variable for counties and found that counties 
were significantly associated with longer audit delays when compared with municipalities.  It is 
expected that counties in the sample from this study will have longer audit delays when 
compared with municipalities, therefore the full-scope-audit regression model will include a 
control variable (COUNTY) coded 1 if the entity is a county and 0 if otherwise.  This variable is 
used to control for the potential effect of organizational differences on the time to file the audit. 
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Compilation Engagements 
As previously mentioned, smaller municipalities in Mississippi are allowed to submit a 
compilation report to the state auditor in lieu of a full-scope audit report.  The auditors of those 
entities are only required to complete certain limited agreed-upon procedures.  As such, many of 
the hypotheses outlined above will not be applicable to those engagements.  The compiled 
financial statements, for example, are limited to a statement of cash receipts and disbursements, 
therefore key financial ratios based on accrual accounting cannot be extracted from those 
statements.  Also, the auditor expresses no opinion concerning the fair presentation of financial 
information.  Finally, municipalities required to file according to the Single Audit Act must also 
complete a full-scope audit.  Based on the discussions from this chapter, the following are 
hypothesized with respect to these limited-scope engagements: 
 
H9a: The total number of reported findings will be positively associated with compilation 
report delay. 
H9b:  A higher number of reported findings will be associated with compilation reports 
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
H10a: The amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness will be negatively 
associated with compilation report delay. 
H10b: A higher amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness will be associated 
with compilation reports meeting state-mandated filing deadlines. 
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H11a: The total number of reported funds will be positively associated with compilation 
report delay. 
H11b: A higher number of reported funds will be associated with compilation reports 
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
H12a: The total number of miles between the auditor and the compilation client will be 
positively associated with compilation report delay. 
H12b: A higher number of miles between the auditor and the compilation client will be 
associated with compilation reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. 
 
H13a: The total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the audit 
firm will be associated with compilation report delay. 
H13b: The total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the audit 
firm will be associated with whether compilation reports meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines. 
 
Empirical Models 
Ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression and logistic regression is used to test hypotheses 
in this study.  The dependent variable, DELAY, is used to test the set of hypotheses dealing with 
report delay (the A-set of hypotheses).  That variable is defined as the number of days from the 
entity’s fiscal year end (September 30, 2007) to the date the audit or compilation report was 
received by the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor, and is log transformed for analysis, as 
visual inspection of the residual distribution using untransformed data revealed a violation of the 
65 
 
normality assumption.  The following OLS regression model is used for tests of full-scope audit 
engagements: 
 
DELAY = ƒ (POSITION, PERFORMANCE, FINDINGS, OPINION, DEBT, SINGLEAUDIT, 
FUNDS, DISTANCE, EXPERTISE, COUNTY) 
 
 
The majority of the data used in the study was obtained from the audited and compiled 
financial reports of each county and municipality.  The variable names, expected impact on audit 
delay, and variable descriptions have been previously discussed.  Table 3 presents a summary of 
the variables along with sources of data.   
The dependent variable, LATE, was used to test those hypotheses dealing with whether 
the governmental entity met or failed to meet the reporting deadlines (the B-set of hypotheses).  
That variable is coded 1 if the audit is filed beyond the state-mandated filing deadline and 0 if the 
audit is filed on or before the state-mandated filing deadline.  The following logistic regression is 
used for full-scope audit engagements:  
 
LATE = ƒ (POSITION, PERFORMANCE, FINDINGS, OPINION, DEBT, SINGLEAUDIT, 
FUNDS, DISTANCE, EXPERTISE, COUNTY)  
 
Many of the local governments in Mississippi are not required to have a full-scope audit 
and instead contract for a compilation report subject to certain agreed-upon procedures to be 
performed by the auditor.  These procedures typically involve a reconciliation of cash on deposit 
with banks to balances in the general ledger accounts, confirmation of cash balances from the 
banks, verification of taxes on real and personal property levied during the year, verification of a 
sample of purchases made by the municipality during the year, and verification of the deposit of  
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Table 3: Description of Variables 
      
Variable     
(Expected Sign) Description Source 
Dependent Variables: 
DELAY Number of days from fiscal year Audited Financial Statements 
  end to the date the audit report is   
  received by the state auditor's office   
  
 
  
LATE =1 if the entity failed to meet Audited Financial Statements 
  the state-mandated reporting   
  deadline, 0 otherwise   
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
POSITION (-) Total Net Assets/Total Revenues Audited Financial Statements 
  
 
  
PERFORMANCE (-) Change in Net Assets/Total Net Assets Audited Financial Statements 
  
 
  
FINDINGS (+) Total number of audit findings Audited Financial Statements 
  issued by the auditor   
  
 
  
OPINION (+) =1 if entity received other than Audited Financial Statements 
  unqualified audit opinion, 0 otherwise   
Accountability: 
DEBT (-) Government's total long-term debt Audited Financial Statements 
  
 
  
SINGLEAUDIT (-) =1 if the entity is subject to the Audited Financial Statements 
  requirements of a Single Audit, 0 otherwise   
Audit Environment: 
FUNDS (+) Number of major funds reported on Audited Financial Statements 
  the entity's financial statements   
  
 
  
DISTANCE (+) Number of miles between auditor's mapquest.com 
  office and the audit client's office   
  
 
  
EXPERTISE (±) Total number of governmental attestation Compiled from Audited 
  engagements performed by the Financial Statements 
  audit firm during the year   
Control Variable: 
COUNTY (±) =1 if audited entity is a county, 0 otherwise Audited Financial Statements 
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payments made by the state to the municipality during the year.  These engagements are subject 
to the same due date as are full-scope audits.   
Since the procedures outlined above do not constitute an audit, many of the variables 
captured in the regression model for full-scope audits do not exist for these compilation 
engagements.  However, to gain a better understanding of the timing of these engagements, the 
following models were examined (See Table 3 for variable descriptions): 
 
DELAY = ƒ (FINDINGS, DEBT, FUNDS, DISTANCE, EXPERTISE) 
LATE = ƒ (FINDINGS, DEBT, FUNDS, DISTANCE, EXPERTISE) 
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CHAPTER IV – RESULTS 
 This research examines audit delay and compilation delay in local governments in 
Mississippi.  It utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test whether certain 
independent variables have an effect on the length of time between the fiscal year-end and the 
date in which the final audited or compiled report is submitted to the Office of the State Auditor.  
The research also utilizes logistic regression to test whether certain independent variables are 
associated with whether audited or compiled financial statements are submitted to the Office of 
the State Auditor within the state-mandated timeframe of one year. 
 Independent variables examined in this study are grouped into three categories: (1) 
Report Content and Managerial Competency, (2) Accountability, and (3) Audit Environment.  
This chapter discusses the findings concerning the following research questions concerning 
governmental entities required to obtain a full-scope audit of its financial statements:  
 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
1)  Is the financial report message, as evidenced by key financial  
statement ratios, a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and  (b) audit 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
2) Is the total number of reported audit findings a significant predictor of (a) audit 
report delay and  (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines? 
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3) Is a qualified or adverse audit opinion a significant predictor of (a) audit  
report delay and  (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines? 
Accountability: 
 
4) Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor 
of (a) audit report delay and  (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-
mandated filing deadlines? 
 
5) Is the earlier filing deadline required under the Single Audit Act a significant 
predictor of (a) audit report delay and  (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet 
state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Audit Environment: 
 
6) Is the number of major funds reported in the government’s financial  
statements a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and  (b) audit reports 
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
 7) Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office a  
significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and  (b) audit reports meeting or 
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
8) Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the 
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports 
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
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Regarding smaller governments that are allowed to complete a compilation engagement, 
this chapter discusses the findings concerning the following research questions:  
 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
9) Is the total number of reported findings a significant predictor of (a) compilation 
report delay and  (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-
mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Accountability: 
10) Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor 
of (a) compilation report delay and  (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to 
meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Audit Environment: 
 11) Is the number of funds reported in the government’s financial  
statements a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and  (b) 
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
12) Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the compilation client’s 
office a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and  (b) compilation 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
71 
 
13) Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the 
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) 
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
The Sample 
 The data used to examine governmental audit and compilation delay were obtained from 
the audited and compiled financial statements of Mississippi governments for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 2007.  Fiscal-year 2007 was chosen to ensure that the governments taking 
the longest to file audited or compiled financial statements would be included in the sample.  The 
final sample included entities filing as late as December 22, 2010. 
 A listing of Mississippi counties and municipalities was obtained which contained an 
initial sample of 82 observations and 298 observations, respectively.  Financial statements were 
obtained for each municipality and county either from the website of the Mississippi Office of 
the State Auditor or directly from that office when financial statements were not present on the 
website.  For Mississippi counties, the final sample included 55 observations, as one was 
removed from the sample since a final audit had not yet been completed for fiscal year 2007, and 
26 were removed from the sample since these audits were completed by the Mississippi Office of 
the State Auditor rather than by a private accounting firm. 
 For the 298 Mississippi municipalities, 22 of the entities were removed from the final 
sample because audited or compiled financial statements were not available as of the date of data 
collection.  Another 30 municipalities were not included in the final sample because the audited 
financial statements of those entities were prepared using an other comprehensive basis of 
accounting rather than GAAP and, therefore, lacked comparability on some of the variables, 
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particularly the financial statement ratio variables.  One municipality was removed from the 
sample because of outlying data.
5
  This resulted in a final sample that included 111 
municipalities submitting audited financial statements and 134 municipalities submitting 
compiled financial statements. 
 
Descriptive Information—Full-Scope Audit Engagements 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for full-scope audits filed on or before the state-
mandated deadline and full-scope audits filed after the state-mandated deadline.  Along with 
statistics for all 166 governmental entities in the sample (55 counties and 111 municipalities), the 
table presents statistics for 98 governmental entities that filed late audits and 68 governmental 
entities that filed timely audits.  Preliminary univariate analysis of each independent variable was 
performed.  Differences for continuous variables were analyzed using t-tests while differences 
for dichotomous variables were analyzed using chi-squared tests.  One-tailed test results are 
presented for variables in which directional predictions were made, while two-tailed test results 
are presented for variables in which no directional prediction was made.  Results of those tests 
are also presented in Table 4 
The mean audit delay (DELAY) for all entities in the sample was 399.66 days.  For audits 
filed in a timely manner, the mean delay was 248.57 days.  For audits filed past the filing 
deadline, the mean audit delay was 504.50 days.  Results of the t-tests and chi-squared tests 
reveal several independent variables that differ significantly between timely filers and late filers, 
mainly in the area of report message content and managerial competency.  Specifically, the 
timely filers and late filers differ on FINDINGS, OPINION, DISTANCE, and the control  
  
                                                          
5
Additional analysis and discussion of this outlying observation is included later in this chapter. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Full-scope Audits and 
a Comparison of Late and Timely Audits 
Variables
a
 Total Late Audits Timely Audits 
  (n=166) (n=98) (N=68) 
Dependent Variable: DELAY 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 399.66 (172.49) 504.50 (142.48) 248.57 (68.06) 
   Range 87 to 1046 367 to 1046 87 to 365 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:   
POSITION 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 2.12 (1.41) 2.07 (1.60) 2.18 (1.10) 
   Range 0.19 to 7.09 0.19 to 7.09 0.21 to 6.21 
PERFORMANCE 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 5.11 (11.44) 4.81 (13.26) 5.53 (8.21) 
   Range -70 to 38 -70 to 38 -18 to 34 
FINDINGS 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 4.11 (5.18) 5.33***(5.74) 2.37*** (3.62) 
   Range 0 to 34 0 to 34 0 to 16 
OPINION (frequency) 21.08% 28.57%*** 10.29%*** 
Accountability:   
DEBT (millions) 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) $17.66 ($35.82) $14.22 ($22.41) $22.61 ($48.90) 
   Range $0 to $352.04 $20.8 to $129.2 $0 to $352.0 
SINGLEAUDIT (frequency) 51.20% 55.10% 45.59% 
Audit Environment:   
FUNDS 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 3.63 (1.49) 3.59 (1.45) 3.69 (1.55) 
   Range 1 to 8 1 to 8 2 to 8 
DISTANCE 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 37.77 (45.75) 45.08** (48.74) 27.22** (39.04) 
   Range 1 to 238 1 to 170 1 to 238 
EXPERTISE 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 6.78 (6.61) 7.16 (7.06) 6.22 (5.90) 
   Range 1 to 24 1 to 24 1 to 24 
Control Variable:   
COUNTY (frequency) 33.13% 46.94%*** 13.24%*** 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
  ***p<0.001 one-tailed test 
   **p<0.01 one-tailed test 
   Note: For comparisons of governments filing late audits and governments filing timely audits, t-tests were 
used to determine significant differences for continuous variables, and chi-squared tests were used to 
determine significant differences for dichotomous variables 
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variable COUNTY.  Each of these significant variables, along with the other independent 
variables in the models are discussed in detail below. 
The mean financial statement position (POSITION) (measured by the ratio of total net 
assets to total revenues) for all governments in the sample was 2.12.  The mean financial 
statement position associated with audits filed in a timely manner was 2.18, while the mean 
financial statement position associated audits filed after the deadline was 2.07.  The mean 
performance ratio (PERFORMANCE) (measured by the ratio of the change in net assets to total 
net assets) for all entities was 5.11.  The mean performance ratio associated with audits filed in a 
timely manner was 5.53.  The mean performance ratio associated with audits filed after the 
deadline was 4.81. 
The mean total number of audit findings for all governmental entities in the sample was 
4.11.  The mean total number of audit findings (FINDINGS) issued for entities in the sample that 
filed in a timely manner was 2.37, while the mean total number of audit findings issued for 
entities that failed to file in a timely manner was 5.33.  The t-tests revealed this to be a 
significant difference (p<0.001, one-tailed).  Concerning the opinion rendered by the auditor on 
the fair presentation of financial statements in accordance with GAAP (OPINION), 21.08 
percent of the governmental entities received an other-than-unqualified audit opinion.  Of those 
entities that filed audits in a timely manner, 10.29 percent of the entities received an other-than-
unqualified audit opinion.  Of those entities that failed to file financial statement audits in a 
timely manner, 28.57 percent received an other-than-unqualified audit opinion.  A chi-squared 
test indicates that this is a significant difference between timely and late filers (p<0.001, one-
tailed). 
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 A review of issues of accountability indicates that the mean dollar amount of long-term 
debt (DEBT) for all entities in the sample was $17,660,000.  The mean dollar amount of long-
term debt for entities in the sample that filed in a timely manner was $22,610,000, while the 
mean dollar amount of long-term debt for entities failing to meet the filing deadline was 
$14,220,000.  For all entities in the sample, 51.20 percent were subject to the requirements of the 
Single Audit Act (SINGLEAUDIT).  Of those entities meeting the filing deadline, 45.59 percent 
were subject to the requirements of the Single Audit Act, and for entities failing to meet the 
filing deadline, 55.10 percent were subject to the requirements of the Single Audit Act. 
 A review of the variables measuring the audit environment indicates that the mean 
number of major funds (FUNDS) reported by all entities was 3.63.  The mean number of major 
funds for entities filing in a timely manner was 3.69.  The mean number of major funds reported 
by entities failing to meet the state-mandated deadline was 3.59.  The average mileage 
(DISTANCE) between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office was 37.77 miles—27.22 
miles for entities that filed in a timely manner and 45.08 miles for entities failing to meet the 
filing deadline.  The t-test reveals DISTANCE to be significantly different between timely and 
late filers (p<0.01, one-tailed).  For auditors captured in the sample, the mean number of 
governmental audit and attestation clients (EXPERTISE) was 6.78—6.22 for those auditors 
associated with audits that were filed in a timely manner and 7.16 for those auditors associated 
with audits that were filed past the state-mandated deadline. 
 The control variable COUNTY was also significantly different between timely and late 
filers (p<0.001, one-tailed).  Counties made up 33.13 percent of the total sample.  In the group of 
timely filers, counties made up 13.24 percent of the sample, while in the group of late filers, 
counties made up 46.94 percent of the sample.  
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Further analysis of the characteristics of municipalities versus counties is presented in 
Table 5.  The table presents statistics for 111 municipalities, 55 counties, which were, for fiscal-
year 2007, subject to a full-scope audit of their financial statements prepared in accordance with 
GAAP.  For ease of interpretation, statistics for all municipalities and counties combined are 
again presented in Table 5.  Univariate analysis of the independent variables was conducted for 
the purpose of determining what differences exist between municipalities and counties.  
Differences between the groups were analyzed using t-tests for continuous variables and chi-
squared tests for categorical variables.  The results of these tests are also presented in Table 5. 
 The mean total delay (DELAY) for all governmental entities in the sample was 399.66 
days.  The mean total delay for the municipalities in the sample was 355.41 days.  For the 
counties, the mean total delay was 488.98 days.  If audit delay was measured as the number of 
days between fiscal year end and the date on the audit report, as it has been measured in prior 
studies, the mean delay for all governmental entities in the sample would be 312.23 days (267.32 
days for municipalities; 402.89 days for counties).  These audit delays for municipalities and 
counties are much greater than the delays observed in prior literature (see Table 1).  In the 
overall sample of municipalities and counties, 59.04 percent of those entities failed to submit 
audited financial statements to the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor within the state-
mandated one-year deadline (LATE).  For municipalities, 46.85 percent of the audited financial 
statements were filed after the one-year deadline.  For counties, 83.64 percent were filed after the 
one-year deadline.  Results of the t-tests and chi-squared tests reveal that counties differ 
significantly from municipalities on several of the independent variables, mainly in the area of 
audit environment.  Specifically, the municipalities and counties differ on FINDINGS,  
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Full-Scope-Audits and 
a Comparison of Cities and Counties 
Variables
a
 Total Cities Counties 
  (n=166) (n=111) (n=55) 
Dependent Variables:       
DELAY 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 399.66 (172.49) 355.41 (171.91) 488.98 (136.23) 
   Range 87 to 1046 87 to 1046 250 to 799 
LATE (frequency) 59.04% 46.85% 83.64% 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:   
POSITION 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 2.12 (1.41) 2.04 (1.23) 2.26 (1.73) 
   Range 0.19 to 7.09 0.19 to 6.34 0.25 to 7.09 
PERFORMANCE 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 5.11 (11.44) 6.04 (10.10) 3.21 (13.67) 
   Range -70 to 38 -42 to 36 -70 to 38 
FINDINGS 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 4.11 (5.18) 2.89*** (3.92) 6.58*** (6.43) 
   Range 0 to 34 0 to 21 0 to 34 
OPINION (frequency) 21.08% 21.62% 20.00% 
Accountability:   
DEBT (millions) 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) $17.66 ($35.82) $17.97 ($40.51) $17.03 ($24.03) 
   Range $0 to $352.0 $0 to $352.0 $0.6 to $125.8 
SINGLEAUDIT (frequency) 51.20% 45.05%* 63.64%* 
Audit Environment:   
FUNDS 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 3.63 (1.49) 3.81* (1.52) 3.27* (1.37) 
   Range 1 to 8 2 to 8 1 to 8 
DISTANCE 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 37.77 (45.75) 30.55** (39.82) 52.33** (53.33) 
   Range 1 to 238 1 to 170 1 to 238 
EXPERTISE 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 6.78 (6.61) 6.45 (6.23) 7.44 (7.32) 
   Range 1 to 24 1 to 24 1 to 24 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
  ***p<0.001 two-tailed test 
   **p<0.01 two-tailed test 
   *p<0.05 two-tailed test 
   Note: For comparisons of city and county governments, t-tests were used to determine significant 
  differences for continuous variables, and chi-squared tests were used to determine significant differences 
  for dichotomous variables 
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SINGLEAUDIT, FUNDS, and DISTANCE.  Each of these significant variables, along with the 
other independent variables, are discussed in detail below. 
 The mean financial statement position (POSITION) (measured by the ratio of total net 
assets to total revenues) was 2.04 for municipalities and 2.26 for counties.  The mean 
performance ratio (PERFORMANCE) (measured by the ratio of the change in net assets to total 
net assets) was 6.04 for municipalities and 3.21 for counties.  These differences were not 
significant. 
 The mean total number of audit findings (FINDINGS) issued for entities in the sample 
was 2.89 for municipalities and 6.58 for counties.  As previously mentioned, a univariate 
analysis revealed this to be a significant difference (p<0.001, two-tailed).  Concerning the 
opinion rendered by the auditor on the fair presentation of financial statements in accordance 
with GAAP (OPINION), 21.62 percent of the municipalities in the sample received an other-
than-unqualified audit opinion, while 20.00 percent of the counties in the sample received an 
other-than-unqualified audit opinion. 
 A review of issues of accountability indicates that the mean dollar amount of long-term 
debt (DEBT) for entities in the sample was $17,970,000 for municipalities and $17,030,000 for 
counties.  Approximately 45 percent of the sampled municipalities were subject to the 
requirements of the Single Audit Act (SINGLEAUDIT), while 63.64 percent of the sampled 
counties were subject to the Act.  Univariate analysis indicated that SINGLEAUDIT was 
significantly different between municipalities and counties (p<0.05, two-tailed). 
 A review of the variables measuring the audit environment indicates that the mean 
number of major funds (FUNDS) reported by municipalities in the sample was 3.81, while the 
mean number of major funds for counties was 3.27.  The average mileage (DISTANCE) between 
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the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office was 30.55 miles for cities and 52.33 miles for 
counties.  Univariate analyses revealed both FUNDS (p<0.05, two-tailed) and DISTANCE 
(p<0.01, two tailed) to be significantly different between municipalities and counties.  For 
auditors captured in the sample, the mean number of governmental audit and attestation clients 
was 6.45 for auditors associated with municipal audits and 7.44 for auditors associated with 
county audits. 
The bivariate correlation coefficients among the independent variables included in the 
model appear in Table 6.  The COUNTY variable is positively correlated with FINDINGS 
(0.337), SINGLEAUDIT (0.175), and DISTANCE (0.225), and it is negatively correlated with 
FUNDS (-0.171).  The OPINION variable (coded 1 when the entity received an other-than-
unqualified opinion) is negatively correlated with PERFORMANCE (-0.178), and it is positively 
correlated with FINDINGS (0.295). DEBT is positively correlated with FUNDS (0.315) and 
SINGLEAUDIT (0.228), while FUNDS is also positively correlated with SINGLEAUDIT 
(0.230).  The DISTANCE variable is positively correlated with OPINION (0.157) and negatively 
correlated with FUNDS (-0.158). 
To assess the presence of multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) and the 
condition indexes were examined.  No values of VIF were greater than 1.50.  The largest 
condition index (the condition number) was 13.0.  Each of these diagnostic measures provides 
evidence that no strong multicollinearity issues are present in the model. 
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Results—Full-Scope Audit Engagements 
 In the first phase of testing, an OLS model
6
 was estimated using as the dependent 
variable the natural log of the number of days from fiscal year end until the date the audit report 
was received by the Office of the State Auditor (DELAY).  Leverage values were examined and 
indicated one influential data point, which was removed from the model.
7
  An examination of 
plots of the residuals indicated no problems with heteroskedasticity.  Table 7 presents the results 
of the regression.  The model’s adjusted R2 (26.48%) and model F-statistic (6.943, p<0.001) 
compare favorably with prior research of governmental audit delay—Dwyer & Wilson (1989): 
12%, Johnson (1996): 17%; Johnson (1998): 21.4%; McLelland & Giroux (2000): 31%; Johnson 
et al. (2002): 21.6%; Payne & Jenson (2002): 13.1%.   
 In the second phase of testing, a logistic regression analysis
8
 was used to determine how 
the variables examined in the first phase of the study affected the outcome of whether the audited 
financial statements were filed within or beyond the state-mandated filing deadline.  The 
dependent variable in the regression (LATE) was coded 0 if the audit was filed in a timely 
manner and 1 if the audit was filed beyond the state-mandated one-year filing deadline. 
 Table 8 presents the results of the logistic regression.  The coefficients indicate that the 
overall model was significant (χ2 = 43.30, p < 0.001), and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test 
indicates goodness of fit (χ2 = 6.72, p = 0.567).  The model was able to correctly classify 69 
                                                          
6
 The sample includes clustered data resulting from some governmental entities in the sample being 
audited by the same audit firm.  Ignoring this results in the regression coefficients remaining unbiased (given that 
the assumptions of OLS are met), however, standard errors are generally underestimated, which inflates the 
likelihood of Type I error.  To counter this, models were estimated using generalized estimating equations (GEE) 
methods that allow for within-cluster correlation of errors; thus producing clustered robust standard errors.  Using 
this approach, the point estimates are the same as in OLS regression, but the standard errors are different 
(Ghisletta & Spini, 2004).  The OLS and GEE models resulted in the same findings regarding significance. 
7
 The results of the regression with the influential data point included are presented and discussed later in 
this chapter. 
8
 A GEE model with a robust estimator was computed and resulted in the same findings regarding 
significance. 
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Table 7: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for  Full-scope Audit 
Engagements 
    
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p- 
  Sign Estimate Error statistic  value  
Intercept 
 
5.613 0.115 42.424 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.013 0.022 -0.579 0.282 
PERFORMANCE - 0.379 0.273 1.390 0.917 
FINDINGS + 0.021 0.007 3.088 0.001 
OPINION + 0.245 0.081 3.033 0.002 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.001 0.001 -1.226 0.111 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.029 0.065 0.455 0.676 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + 0.013 0.022 0.586 0.280 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.005 0.069 0.068 0.473 
EXPERTISE ± 0.000 0.005 0.062 0.951 
  
    
  
Control Variables: 
    
  
COUNTY + 0.326 0.074 4.406 <0.001 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    N 
 
166 
   Model F-statistic 
 
6.943 
   Prob (F-statistic) 
 
<0.001 
   R
2
 
 
0.309 
   Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.265 
   Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings 
of Full-scope Audits 
     
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept   1.938 0.977 3.938 0.047 6.947 
  
     
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.118 0.134 0.774 0.190 0.889 
PERFORMANCE - 1.240 1.904 0.424 0.743 3.457 
FINDINGS + 0.104 0.055 3.554 0.030 1.109 
OPINION + 1.136 0.528 4.625 0.016 0.321 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.011 0.007 2.333 0.064 0.989 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.320 0.395 0.656 0.791 0.726 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS + 0.115 0.136 0.721 0.198 1.122 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.594 0.453 1.721 0.095 1.811 
EXPERTISE ± 0.009 0.030 0.097 0.755 1.009 
  
     
  
Control Variables: 
     
  
COUNTY + 1.610 0.482 11.149 0.001 0.200 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 166 
χ2 43.300, p<0.001 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.230 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.310 
McFadden's R
2
 0.193 
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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percent of government entities that filed audits in a timely manner and 74 percent of those that  
filed late, for an overall success rate of 72 percent.  The model had a Cox & Snell R
2
 of 0.230, a 
Nagelkerke R
2
 of 0.310, and a McFadden’s R2 of 0.193.  The following sections discuss the 
results of the OLS regression and the logistic regression based on hypothesis grouping. 
 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency—Financial Statement Ratios 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that a favorable report message, as measured by key financial 
statement ratios, will be negatively associated with audit report delay.  Prior research has seldom 
included financial statement ratios in their analyses.  The exception is Dwyer & Wilson (1989), 
which included the ratio of general fund balance to general fund revenues as a measure of 
financial viability.  In that study, the ratio was found to have no significance with respect to total 
audit report delay.  
For this study, two ratios were included in the model.  POSITION was defined as Total 
Net Assets / Total Revenue, and it measures the extent to which cumulative revenues exceed 
cumulative costs.  PERFORMANCE was defined as Change In Net Assets / Total Net Assets, 
and it measures how much of the current year’s surplus or deficit contributed to the cumulative 
net assets.  A high POSITION or PERFORMANCE ratio would provide a measure of favorable 
report content, while a lower POSITION or PERFORMANCE ratio would provide a measure 
less favorable report content.  The hypothesis was based on the premise that good news is 
reported more quickly than is bad news and that favorable financial statement ratios are an 
indication of higher quality management. 
The coefficient for POSITION was in the predicted direction but was not significant 
(Table 7), suggesting that financial statement position has no major effect on external audit 
report timing.  The coefficient for PERFORMANCE was in the opposite direction predicted.  
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There is no evidence that the good or bad news associated with financial-statement content has 
any significant bearing on the timing of the audit report.  Hypothesis 1a is not supported by the 
results of the regression. 
Hypothesis 1b predicts that a favorable report message, as measured by the key financial 
statement ratios POSITION and PERFORMANCE, would be associated with audit reports 
meeting state-mandated filing deadlines.  Similar to the results from Hypothesis 1a, the 
coefficient for POSITION was in the predicted direction but was not significant, while the 
coefficient for PERFORMANCE was in the opposite direction predicted (Table 8).  There is no 
evidence that good or bad news associated with financial-statement content has any bearing on 
the incidence of late filing of audit reports.  Hypothesis 1b is not supported. 
 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency—Audit Findings  
 Hypothesis 2a predicts that the total number of findings reported by the auditor will be 
associated with longer audit delay.  In prior studies of municipal audit delay, the effect of this 
variable has not been examined.  In their study of the timing of school-district audits, Carslaw et 
al. (2007) included an indicator variable for whether the auditor cited a reportable condition and 
an indicator variable for whether the auditor identified a material noncompliance in internal 
control over financial reporting.  In that study, both variables were found to be significantly 
associated with longer delay in filing audit reports. 
 In this study, the variable, FINDINGS, was defined as the total number of findings issued 
by the auditor in the report, whether those findings are classified as material weaknesses, 
significant deficiencies not considered to be material weaknesses, or findings of noncompliance 
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with laws and regulations.  FINDINGS was positive and significant with respect to audit report 
delay (p=0.001, one-tailed) (Table 7), thus providing support for Hypothesis 2a. 
 Hypothesis 2b predicts that a higher number of reported audit findings will be associated 
with audit reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  The results of the logistic 
regression analysis provides evidence that the number of audit findings is significantly associated 
with audit reports that are not filed in a timely manner (p=0.03, one-tailed) (Table 8).  For each 
one-unit increase in the number of audit findings, the odds of a late audit increase by 1.109.  
Hypothesis 2b is supported. 
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency—Audit Opinion  
 Hypothesis 3a predicts that the opinion rendered by the auditor will have an effect on 
audit delay, specifically that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion will be associated with 
longer audit delays.  The results of prior studies’ examination of audit opinion have been mixed.  
Dwyer & Wilson (1989), Rubin (1992), and McClelland & Giroux (2000) did not find a 
significant association with the type of audit opinion and audit delay.  Payne & Jenson (2002), 
however, found that municipalities with a qualified audit opinion experienced increased audit 
delay.  Also, Carslaw et al. (2007), in their study of delay in school district audits, found that an 
unqualified audit opinion was significantly associated with decreased time in four of the five 
years studied. 
 In this study OPINION was coded 1 if the entity received an other-than-unqualified audit 
opinion (i.e. an adverse or qualified opinion) and 0 if the entity received an unqualified audit 
opinion.  The results of the OLS regression indicate that OPINION is significantly associated 
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with increased audit delay (p=0.002, one-tailed) (Table 7).  H3a is supported.  This finding is 
consistent with the finding of Payne & Jenson (2002). 
 Hypothesis 3b predicts that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion will be associated 
with audits that are filed with the state beyond the mandated filing deadline.  Results of the 
logistic regression provide evidence that OPINION is significantly associated with audits that are 
filed late (p=0.016, one-tailed) (Table 8).  Hypothesis 3b is supported. 
Further analysis regarding whether an adverse audit opinion or a qualified audit opinion 
affects audit report delay differently is not possible with the data from this study.  Of the 166 
observations in the study, only three received an adverse audit opinion.  One of those entities 
filed a timely audit (total audit delay of 305 days), while two of those entities filed audits with 
the state beyond the filing deadline (total audit delays of 382 days and 542 days). 
 
Accountability—Long-Term Debt 
 
 Hypothesis 4a predicts that the amount of bonded or other long-term indebtedness will 
lead to decreased audit delay.  Prior studies of governmental audit delay have approached this 
area in different ways.  Rubin (1992) included a variable for debt-per-capita but found no 
significance with regard to audit delay.  McLelland & Giroux (2000) included a variable for the 
bond rating of the entity and also found no significance regarding audit delay.  Payne & Jenson 
(2002) included an indicator variable for whether the government had outstanding bonded debt 
and found that the presence of such debt significantly decreased audit report delay. 
 In this study, the total amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness was included 
as a variable with the reasoning that any long-term indebtedness, not just bonded indebtedness, 
should impact the government’s need to satisfy creditors by issuing timely financial reports. 
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DEBT was not found to be significantly associated with decreased audit report delay (Table 7).  
Hypothesis 4a is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 4b predicts that a higher amount of long-term debt will be associated with 
governments that file timely financial reports with the state.  Results of the logistic regression 
provide some evidence that DEBT is associated with timely financial statements (p=0.064, one-
tailed) (Table 8).  This has important implications in that it appears that either the auditor or the 
governmental entity are making a conscious effort to complete certain audits (i.e. ones in which 
the governmental entities have added accountability to creditors) in a timely manner. 
 
Accountability—Single Audit 
  Hypothesis 5a predicts that governments required to report according to the requirements 
of the Single Audit Act will be associated with decreased audit delay due to the earlier filing 
deadline for such audits.  Payne & Jenson (2002) included an indicator variable for the presence 
of Single Audit requirements and found that the Single Audit was associated with increased audit 
delay at the p=0.10 significance level. 
 In this study, SINGLEAUDIT was coded 1 if the government was subject to the Single 
Audit requirements and 0 otherwise.  SINGLEAUDIT was not found to be significantly 
associated with decreased audit report delay (Table 7).  In fact, the coefficient for 
SINGLEAUDIT was not in the predicted direction.  Hypothesis 5a is not supported, which 
provides evidence that neither the additional accountability of those entities required to file under 
the Single Audit act nor the narrower filing window lead to decreased audit report delay. 
 Hypothesis 5b predicts that governments required to report according to the requirements 
of the Single Audit Act will be associated with audit reports that are filed in a timely manner.  
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The results of the logistic regression indicate that SINGLEAUDIT is not significantly associated 
with timely filing of financial reports (Table 8).  Hypothesis 5b is not supported. 
 It was noted that only 27.5 percent of Mississippi entities required to file Single Audit 
reports did so before the nine-month deadline.  Of those entities, the majority (77.3 percent) 
managed to file their full audit report with the state auditor before the one-year deadline.  Of 
those filing timely Single Audit reports but late full-scope audit reports to the state, only one city 
filed its full-scope audit report more than three weeks after the one-year deadline.  Of the 72.5 
percent of Mississippi entities that filed late Single Audit reports, the majority (81.0 percent) also 
filed late audits with the state auditor. 
 
Audit Environment—Major Funds 
 Hypothesis 6a predicts that the total number of reported major funds will increase audit 
report delay.  Prior studies of governmental audit delay were conducted prior to the enactment of 
GASB Statement No. 34, which required the determination and reporting of major funds, making 
this the first study to examine the impact of major funds on audit delay.  Payne & Jenson (2002) 
included an indicator variable coded 0 if the entity reported three or fewer funds and 1 if the 
entity reported more than three funds.  Their results provided no evidence of a significant 
relationship between the total number of reported funds and audit report delay. 
 In this study, FUNDS is defined as the total number of major funds reported on the 
government’s financial statements.  The results of the OLS regression indicate that the total 
number of reported major funds is not significantly associated with longer audit report delay 
(Table 7).  Hypothesis 6a is not supported. 
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 Hypothesis 6b predicts that a higher number of reported major funds will be associated 
with audits filed beyond the state-mandated filing deadline.  Results of the logistic regression 
indicate that FUNDS is not significantly associated with untimely financial reporting (Table 8).  
Hypothesis 6b is not supported. 
  
Audit Environment—Travel Distance 
 Hypothesis 7a predicts that a greater total travel distance between the auditor’s office and 
the audit client’s office will be associated with longer audit report delays.  Prior research of 
governmental audit delay has not examined this variable with regard to audit timeliness.  The 
results of the OLS regression provide no evidence that as the mileage traveled increases, so does 
the amount of delay in filing the audited financial statements (Table 7).  Hypothesis 7a is not 
supported. 
 Hypothesis 7b predicts that a greater travel distance between the auditor’s office and the 
audit client’s office will be associated with audit reports failing to meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines.  The results of the logistic regression provide minimal evidence that greater travel 
distance is associated with untimely financial statement reports (p<0.095, one-tailed) (Table 8). 
 
Audit Environment—Auditor Expertise 
 Hypothesis 8a predicts that the total number of governmental attestation engagements 
performed by an audit firm will be associated with audit delay.  Payne & Jenson (2002) 
measured auditor expertise with an indicator variable coded 1 if the auditor performed two or 
more municipal audits within their sample and 0 otherwise.  The results of their study provided 
evidence that as the number of municipal audit clients increases, the audit report delay decreases.  
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Carslaw et al (2007) measured auditor expertise with an indicator variable coded 1 if the auditor 
performed more than five single audits during the year and 0 otherwise.  They found that auditor 
expertise significantly decreased audit report delay for school districts in three of the five years 
they examined. 
 In this study, auditor expertise is measured by the total number of governmental audit and 
attestation engagements performed by the audit firm during the year.  Regression results indicate 
that auditor expertise, as measured by the total number of clients, is not significantly associated 
with audit report delay (Table 7).  Hypothesis 8a is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 8b predicts that the total number of governmental audit and attestation 
engagements performed by the audit firm will be associated with whether audit reports meet 
state-mandated audit-filing deadlines.  The results of the logistic regression indicate no 
significant relationship between the number of audit clients and timely financial reporting (Table 
8).  Hypothesis 8b is not supported.
9
 
 
Additional Procedures—Full-Scope Audit Engagements 
Audit Findings 
To achieve a more thorough understanding of the impact of audit findings on the level of 
audit report delay, the OLS regression and the logistic regression models were recomputed after 
replacing the total number of audit findings (FINDINGS) with the total number of more serious 
audit findings, those classified by the auditor as material weaknesses (MATWEAK).  This 
excludes audit findings classified as either (1) noncompliance with laws and regulations or (2) 
significant deficiencies not deemed to be material weaknesses. The mean total number of 
                                                          
9
 The regression results yielded significant results for the control variable COUNTY.  That variable is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
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material-weakness findings reported for all entities in the sample was 1.30 (1.10 for 
municipalities; 1.71 for counties).  For governmental entities filing audits in a timely manner, the 
mean number of material-weakness findings was 0.76, while the mean number of material-
weakness findings for late filers was 1.67.  The results of the regression model that includes 
MATWEAK are presented in Table 9, and the results of the logistic model that includes 
MATWEAK are presented in Table 10. 
 Results of the OLS regression (Table 9) indicate that the total number of material-
weakness findings (MATWEAK) is positively and significantly associated with audit report 
delay (p=0.003, one-tailed).  Results of the logistic regression (Table 10) indicate that 
MATWEAK does have some association with whether audits are filed on time, but it not carry 
the same level of statistical significance (p=0.057, one-tailed) as the OLS regression measuring 
the effect of material weaknesses on the number of days of audit delay. 
 Separate OLS and logistic regression models were also computed after excluding all 
material-weakness findings and including only noncompliance and significant-deficiency 
findings (OTHERFIND).  The purpose of these models are to provide more comprehensive 
evidence regarding the effect the audit finding’s level of seriousness has on the delay of the audit 
report.  The mean total number of noncompliance and significant deficiency findings reported for 
all entities in the sample was 2.80 (1.78 for municipalities; 4.87 for counties).  For governmental 
entities filing audits in a timely manner, the mean number of noncompliance and significant 
deficiency findings was 1.60, while the mean number of noncompliance and significant 
deficiency findings for late filers was 3.62.  The results of the regression model that includes 
OTHERFIND are presented in Table 11, and the results of the logistic model that includes 
OTHERFIND are presented in Table 12. 
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Table 9: OLS Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Classified as   
Material Weaknesses Contribute to Delay of Full-scope Audits 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p-value 
  Sign Estimate Error  statistic   
Intercept 
 
5.656 0.115 49.095 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.022 0.022 -1.005 0.158 
PERFORMANCE - 0.441 0.275 1.606 0.945 
MATWEAK + 0.051 0.018 2.846 0.003 
OPINION + 0.222 0.085 2.600 0.005 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.001 0.001 -1.137 0.129 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.032 0.065 0.493 0.689 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + 0.011 0.023 0.475 0.318 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + -0.004 0.069 -0.051 0.521 
EXPERTISE ± -0.001 0.005 -0.298 0.766 
  
    
  
Control Variables: 
    
  
COUNTY + 0.376 0.070 5.385 <0.001 
a 
MATWEAK is defined as the total number of audit findings issued by the auditor that 
were classified as material weaknesses.  See Table 3 for a description of other variables 
n 
 
166 
   Model F-statistic 
 
6.747 
   Prob (F-statistic) 
 
<0.001 
   R
2
 
 
0.303 
   Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.258 
   Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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Table 10: Logistic Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings 
Classified as Material Weaknesses Contribute to Late Filings of   
Full-scope Audits 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept   2.197 0.956 5.280 0.022 9.001 
  
     
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.149 0.134 1.232 0.134 0.862 
PERFORMANCE - 1.469 1.902 0.597 0.780 4.347 
MATWEAK + 0.210 0.133 2.509 0.057 1.234 
OPINION + 1.069 0.547 3.819 0.026 0.344 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.010 0.007 2.302 0.065 0.990 
SINGLEAUDIT - -0.344 0.395 0.759 0.192 0.709 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS + 0.120 0.137 0.762 0.192 1.127 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.584 0.462 1.601 0.103 1.794 
EXPERTISE ± 0.009 0.030 0.087 0.768 1.009 
  
     
  
Control Variables: 
     
  
COUNTY + 1.796 0.466 14.875 <0.001 0.166 
a 
MATWEAK is defined as the total number of audit findings issued by the auditor that 
were classified as material weaknesses.  See Table 3 for a description of other variables 
n 166 
χ2 41.81, p<0.001 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.223 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.300 
McFadden's R
2
 0.186 
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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Table 11: OLS Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Not Classified as 
Material Weaknesses Contribute to Delay of Full-scope Audits 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p- 
  Sign Estimate Error statistic   value 
Intercept 
 
5.603 0.116 48.143 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.010 0.022 -0.468 0.321 
PERFORMANCE - 0.357 0.276 1.295 0.902 
OTHERFIND + 0.022 0.009 2.578 0.006 
OPINION + 0.285 0.079 3.626 <0.001 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.001 0.001 -1.184 0.119 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.024 0.065 0.639 0.643 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + 0.017 0.022 0.754 0.226 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.000 0.070 -0.005 0.996 
EXPERTISE ± 0.001 0.005 0.267 0.789 
  
    
  
Control Variables: 
    
  
COUNTY + 0.337 0.075 4.467 <0.001 
a 
OTHERFIND is defined as the total number of audit findings issued by the auditor that 
were not classified as material weaknesses. See Table 3 for a description of other variables 
n 166 
    Model F-statistic 6.549 
    Prob (F-statistic) <0.001 
    R
2
 0.297 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.252 
    Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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Table 12: Logistic Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Not Classified as 
Material Weaknesses Contribute to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept             
  
 
2.107 0.963 4.793 0.029 8.227 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.103 0.135 0.581 0.223 0.902 
PERFORMANCE - 1.067 1.882 0.321 0.715 2.906 
OTHERFIND + 0.115 0.069 2.783 0.048 1.122 
OPINION + 1.299 0.514 6.389 0.006 0.273 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.011 0.007 2.211 0.069 0.989 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.295 0.395 0.559 0.773 0.744 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS + 0.123 0.135 0.831 0.181 1.131 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.554 0.447 1.540 0.108 1.741 
EXPERTISE ± 0.012 0.029 0.174 0.676 1.012 
  
     
  
Control Variables: 
     
  
COUNTY + 1.633 0.485 11.335 0.001 0.195 
a 
OTHERFIND is defined as the total number of audit findings issued by the auditor that 
were not classified as material weaknesses. See Table 3 for a description of other variables 
N 166 
χ2 42.344, p<0.001 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.225 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.304 
McFadden's R
2
 0.188 
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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 The results of the OLS regression (Table 11) provide evidence that the total number of 
compliance and significant deficiency findings (OTHERFIND) is positively and significantly 
associated with audit report delay (p=0.006, one-tailed).  The results of the logistic regression 
(Table 12) provide evidence that OTHERFIND is positively and significantly associated with 
audit reports failing to meet the state-mandated filing deadlines (p=0.048, one-tailed).  Taken as 
a whole, the evidence regarding audit findings indicates that the quantity of instances that result 
in audit findings has a slightly greater impact on audit delay than does the audit finding’s level of 
materiality. 
 
Major Funds 
As mentioned previously, prior studies of governmental audit delay were conducted prior 
to the enactment of GASB Statement No. 34, which required the determination and reporting of 
major funds, making this the first study to examine the impact of major funds on audit delay.  
Payne & Jenson (2002) included an indicator variable coded 0 if the entity reported three or 
fewer funds and 1 if the entity reported more than three funds.  Their results provided no 
evidence of a significant relationship between the total number of reported funds and audit report 
delay.  To approach this area in a way that is consistent with prior research, the FUNDS variable 
in this study was redefined in a way similar to Payne & Jenson (2002).  The variable was 
expressed as a categorical variable with 0 indicating three or fewer reported major funds and 1 
indicating greater than three reported major funds.  Frequencies indicated that 55.4 percent of the 
observations in the sample had three or fewer major funds, while 44.6 percent had greater than 
three reported major funds.  Results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 13, while 
results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 14.   
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Table 13: OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How the Number of 
Reported Major Funds Contributes to Delay of Full-scope Audits 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p- 
  Sign Estimate Error  statistic value  
Intercept 
 
5.641 0.088 63.901 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.013 0.022 -0.579 0.282 
PERFORMANCE - 0.379 0.273 1.390 0.917 
FINDINGS + 0.020 0.007 3.051 0.002 
OPINION + 0.246 0.081 3.045 0.002 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.001 0.001 -1.220 0.112 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.033 0.063 0.517 0.697 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS(RE-DEFINED) + 0.045 0.063 0.720 0.236 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.003 0.069 0.042 0.484 
EXPERTISE ± 0.000 0.005 0.011 0.991 
  
    
  
Control Variables: 
    
  
COUNTY + 0.326 0.073 4.443 <0.001 
a 
FUNDS(RE-DEFINED) is an indicator variable coded 1 if the governmental entity 
reported greater than 3 major funds, 0 otherwise. See Table 3 for a description of other 
variables 
N 166 
    Model F-statistic 6.968 
    Prob (F-statistic) <0.001 
    R
2
 0.31 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.266 
    Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
      
 
 
 
99 
 
Table 14: Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How the Number 
of Reported Major Funds Contributes to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept   2.782 0.947 8.634 0.003 16.155 
  
     
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.117 0.134 0.769 0.191 0.889 
PERFORMANCE - 1.356 1.893 0.513 0.763 3.879 
FINDINGS + 0.104 0.056 3.475 0.031 1.110 
OPINION + 1.172 0.530 4.883 0.014 0.310 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.012 0.007 2.544 0.056 0.988 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.343 0.390 0.772 0.810 0.710 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS(RE-DEFINED) + 0.597 0.386 2.394 0.061 0.551 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.591 0.453 1.706 0.096 1.806 
EXPERTISE ± 0.007 0.030 0.059 0.809 1.007 
  
     
  
Control Variables: 
     
  
COUNTY + 1.651 0.482 11.709 0.001 0.192 
a 
FUNDS(RE-DEFINED) is an indicator variable coded 1 if the governmental entity reported 
greater than 3 major funds, 0 otherwise. See Table 3 for a description of other variables 
n 166 
χ2 45.016, p<0.001 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.238 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.320 
McFadden's R
2
 0.200 
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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The results of the OLS regression (Table 13) are similar to those previously reported and 
indicate no significance with regard to audit report delay.  The results of the logistic regression 
model (Table 14) provided some evidence that a more complex audit, as indicated by the total 
number of reported major funds, has some association with untimely filing of audit reports 
(p=0.061, one-tailed). 
 
Travel Distance 
Regarding the DISTANCE variable, it is reasonable to assume that the amount of auditor 
procrastination due to travel considerations might be more pronounced for auditors having 
multiple governmental audit clients.  As such, the OLS and logistic regressions were recomputed 
after omitting all observations from the sample that had auditors with only one governmental 
attestation client in fiscal-year 2007.  This reduces the sample to 139 observations.  For this 
reduced sample, the mean total travel distance between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s 
office was 40.42 miles.  For governmental entities that filed timely audits, the mean travel 
distance was 27.38.  For governmental entities that filed late audits, the mean travel distance was 
49.23.  The results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 15, and the results of the logistic 
regression are presented in Table 16.   
Again, the results of the OLS regression (Table 15) provide no evidence of a positive 
relationship between travel distance and audit report delay.  The results of the logistic regression 
model (Table 16), however, indicates a stronger relationship between travel distance and  
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Table 15: OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel 
Distance Contributes to Delay of Full-scope Audits 
  
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p- 
  Sign Estimate Error statistic  value  
Intercept 
 
5.468 0.135 40.537 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - 0.013 0.025 0.533 0.703 
PERFORMANCE - 0.638 0.350 1.823 0.965 
FINDINGS + 0.020 0.008 2.484 0.007 
OPINION + 0.249 0.087 2.880 0.003 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - 0.000 0.001 -0.264 0.792 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.032 0.072 0.447 0.672 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + 0.027 0.026 1.036 0.151 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.025 0.072 0.346 0.365 
EXPERTISE ± 0.001 0.005 0.212 0.832 
  
    
  
Control Variables: 
    
  
COUNTY + 0.325 0.082 3.979 <0.001 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 139 
    Model F-statistic 5.510 
    Prob (F-statistic) <0.001 
    R
2
 0.301 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.246 
    Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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Table 16: Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel 
Distance Contributes to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits 
  
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept   1.182 1.037 1.300 0.254 3.262 
  
     
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - 0.004 0.147 0.001 0.510 1.004 
PERFORMANCE - 1.767 2.085 0.718 0.802 5.852 
FINDINGS + 0.111 0.059 3.548 0.030 1.118 
OPINION + 1.265 0.553 5.240 0.011 0.282 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.008 0.008 0.904 0.171 0.992 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.383 0.430 0.793 0.814 0.682 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS + 0.163 0.156 1.097 0.148 1.177 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.763 0.465 2.691 0.051 2.146 
EXPERTISE ± 0.028 0.032 0.761 0.383 1.029 
  
     
  
Control Variables: 
     
  
COUNTY + 1.511 0.513 8.684 0.002 0.221 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 139 
χ2 37.472, p<0.001 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.236 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.319 
McFadden's R
2
 0.200 
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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untimely filing of financial audits (p=0.051, one-tailed).  These results provide some support for 
Hypothesis 7b. 
 
Auditor Expertise 
 Payne & Jenson (2002) measured auditor expertise with an indicator variable coded 1 if 
the auditor performed two or more municipal audits within their sample and 0 otherwise.  The 
results of their study provided evidence that as the number of municipal audit clients increases, 
the audit report delay decreases.  To remain consistent with this previous study, the OLS 
regression and logistic regression were recomputed after expressing the EXPERTISE variable as 
a categorical variable coded 1 for audit firms that performed more than one governmental audit 
or attestation engagement during the year and 0 otherwise.  The results (not tabulated) provided 
no further evidence that the number of government attestation clients was significantly 
associated with audit report delay. 
 
Government Performance 
It was previously reported that one outlying observation was excluded from the 
regression models in the study.  That particular municipality received a $36 million grant during 
the year, which greatly increased its PERFORMANCE ratio (defined as Change In Net Assets / 
Total Net Assets).  That municipality also had a 1,024-day audit report delay.  The results of the 
OLS regression that includes that municipality in the sample are presented in Table 17, while the 
results of the logistic regression that includes that municipality are presented in Table 18. 
 Hypothesis 1a predicted that favorable performance by the governmental entity will be 
associated with shorter audit delay, while Hypothesis 1b predicted that favorable performance  
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Table 17: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Full-scope 
Audits; Outlying Data Point Included 
   
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t-statistic p-value 
  Sign Estimate Error     
Intercept   5.603 0.114 48.981 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.012 0.022 -0.548 0.585 
PERFORMANCE - 0.514 0.236 2.173 0.031 
FINDINGS + 0.021 0.007 3.157 0.002 
OPINION + 0.260 0.079 3.270 0.001 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.001 0.001 -1.234 0.219 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.033 0.065 0.515 0.607 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + 0.013 0.022 0.569 0.570 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.002 0.069 0.035 0.972 
EXPERTISE ± 0.000 0.005 0.047 0.963 
  
    
  
Control Variables: 
    
  
COUNTY + 0.325 0.074 4.395 <0.001 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the 
variables 
    n 167 
    Model F-statistic 7.569 
    Prob (F-statistic) <0.001 
    R
2
 0.327 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.284 
    Note: Two-tailed test  
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Table 18: Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings 
of Full-scope Audits; Outlying Data Point Included 
  
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept   1.941 0.977 3.948 0.047 6.966 
  
     
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.117 0.133 0.767 0.381 0.445 
PERFORMANCE - 1.372 1.808 0.576 0.448 3.942 
FINDINGS + 0.105 0.055 3.636 0.057 1.110 
OPINION + 1.151 0.525 4.796 0.029 0.316 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.011 0.007 2.340 0.126 0.989 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.321 0.395 0.657 0.418 0.726 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS + 0.116 0.136 0.727 0.394 1.123 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.595 0.453 1.721 0.190 1.812 
EXPERTISE ± 0.009 0.030 0.097 0.755 1.009 
  
     
  
Control Variables: 
     
  
COUNTY + 1.613 0.483 11.167 0.001 0.199 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 167 
χ2 44.257 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.233 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.314 
McFadden's R
2
 0.196 
Note: Two-tailed test  
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will be associated with timely audit reports.  As previously reported, the coefficient for this 
variable was in the opposite direction than was predicted, however that variable was not 
statistically significant.  The hypotheses in this study were based on the premise that good news 
is reported more quickly than bad news is reported and that favorable financial statement ratios 
are an indication of higher quality management, but the results provide no evidence to support 
this premise in a governmental setting.  Table 17 reports two-tailed test results for the purpose of 
highlighting the need for future research in this area.  The results indicate that PERFORMANCE 
would have resulted in a statistically significant positive association between PERFORMANCE 
and DELAY, if the outlying observation was included in the model.  The results of the logistic 
regression, presented in Table 18, reveal no significant relationship between PERFORMANCE 
and LATE, however, the results presented in Table 17 indicate a need for future research in this 
area. 
 
Municipal Audits 
 Table 5 illustrates that large differences exist between counties and municipalities on 
some of the independent variables used in this study.  The control variable, COUNTY, was 
statistically significant in each regression model that was estimated, thus indicating that county 
audits take significantly longer to complete than do municipal audits.  This is consistent with 
Johnson (1998).  To provide further evidence that the magnitude of some of the independent 
variables for the counties in the sample did not drive the regression results, separate OLS and 
logistic regressions were computed for only the municipalities in the sample.  The results of the 
OLS regression are presented in Table 19, and the results of the logistic regression are presented 
in Table 20. 
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Table 19: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Full-scope 
Audits of Municipalities 
     
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p- 
  Sign Estimate Error statistic  value  
Intercept 
 
5.673 0.155 36.622 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.045 0.034 -1.319 0.095 
PERFORMANCE - 0.675 0.419 1.612 0.945 
FINDINGS + 0.031 0.012 2.642 0.005 
OPINION + 0.354 0.108 3.273 0.001 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.001 0.001 -0.856 0.197 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.102 0.089 1.150 0.874 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + -0.015 0.030 -0.492 0.688 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.002 0.109 0.014 0.495 
EXPERTISE ± 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.844 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 111 
    Model F-statistic 3.684 
    Prob (F-statistic) 0.001 
    R
2
 0.247 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.18 
    Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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Table 20: Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings 
of Full-scope Audits of Municipalities 
   
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept   1.321 1.099 1.444 0.230 3.747 
  
     
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.302 0.191 2.504 0.057 0.739 
PERFORMANCE - 1.294 2.299 0.317 0.714 3.648 
FINDINGS + 0.100 0.067 2.223 0.068 1.105 
OPINION + 1.289 0.588 4.812 0.014 3.629 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.010 0.008 1.385 0.120 0.990 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.519 0.467 1.237 0.867 0.595 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS + -0.040 0.164 0.059 0.596 0.961 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.813 0.577 1.986 0.080 2.256 
EXPERTISE ± 0.030 0.036 0.668 0.414 1.030 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 111 
χ2 20.485, p=0.015 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.169 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.225 
McFadden's R
2
 0.090 
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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The results indicate that the governmental entity’s financial statement position 
(POSITION) is a more important determinant of DELAY for municipalities (p=0.095, one-
tailed), with a more favorable financial statement position resulting in somewhat shorter audit 
delay.  POSITION is also more strongly associated with more timely audits for municipalities 
(p=0.057, one-tailed).  Also, for municipalities, FINDINGS remain strongly associated with 
DELAY (p=0.005, one-tailed), but not as strongly associated with LATE audits (p=0.068, one-
tailed).  Finally, DEBT is no longer a marginally significant determinant of LATE in the model 
containing only municipalities. 
 
A Different Measure of DELAY 
As previously mentioned, the majority of the prior studies of governmental audit delay 
measured audit delay as the number of days between the entity’s fiscal year end and the date on 
the audit report.  In this study, audit delay is measured as the number of days between the 
entity’s fiscal year end and the date the audit or compilation was received by the state auditor’s 
office.  This measure is perceived to be superior, as it more closely represents the date in which 
the reports are made available to the public.  The date on the audit report is also subject to 
manipulation and inconsistent interpretation and application of the auditing standards. 
For purposes of comparison, the OLS model from this study was examined after re-
defining DELAY as the number of days between the entity’s fiscal year end and the date on the 
audit report.  Results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 21.  In this model, the 
variables FINDINGS, OPINION, and COUNTY remain significant and in the predicted 
direction.  The most striking difference occurs with the DISTANCE variable.  In the original 
model (Table 7), DISTANCE was not significant but was in the predicted direction.  In the  
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Table 21: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay of  Full-scope 
Audits: DELAY Measured by Date on the Audit Report 
  
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p- 
  Sign Estimate Error  statistic value  
Intercept 
 
5.202 0.149 34.960 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
POSITION - -0.034 0.028 -1.178 0.121 
PERFORMANCE - 0.630 0.354 1.783 0.962 
FINDINGS + 0.025 0.009 2.925 0.002 
OPINION + 0.325 0.105 3.101 0.001 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - -0.001 0.001 -0.876 0.191 
SINGLEAUDIT - 0.082 0.084 0.983 0.837 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + 0.034 0.029 1.164 0.123 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + -0.152 0.090 -1.690 0.954 
EXPERTISE ± 0.001 0.006 0.154 0.878 
  
    
  
Control Variables: 
    
  
COUNTY + 0.482 0.096 5.028 <0.001 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 166 
    Model F-statistic 7.611 
    Prob (F-statistic) <0.001 
    R
2
 0.329 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.286 
    Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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model with DELAY redefined, the coefficient for DISTANCE is in the opposite direction as 
predicted and two-tailed test results would result in marginal significance (p=0.093, two-tailed).  
The coefficient for the PERFORMANCE variable in the original model was in the opposite 
direction as predicted.  In the model with DELAY redefined, the coefficient for the 
PERFORMANCE variable is also in the opposite direction as predicted but two-tailed test results 
would have resulted in marginal significance (p=0.077, two-tailed).  The findings concerning 
DISTANCE and PERFORMANCE between the two models provide some evidence that 
different findings may occur depending on how DELAY is measured in the model. 
 
Compilation and Agreed-upon-procedures Engagements 
In addition to examining audit delay for full-scope audits in governments, this research 
also examines the delay associated with other attestation engagements in local governments in 
Mississippi.  In Mississippi, the accounting requirements, and thus the auditing requirements, 
depend on the amount of municipal revenues or expenditures.  Municipalities with revenues or 
expenditures totaling less than $1 million may, in lieu of contracting for a full-scope audit of 
financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, contract for the preparation of a 
compilation report after the auditor applies certain agreed-upon procedures. 
 Similar to the procedures applied to the full-scope audits in this study, OLS regression is 
used to test whether certain independent variables have an effect on the number of days between 
the fiscal year end and the date in which the final compilation report is submitted to the Office of 
the State Auditor.  The research also utilizes logistic regression to test whether certain 
independent variables are associated with whether compiled financial statements are submitted to 
the Office of the State Auditor within the state-mandated timeframe of one year. 
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 Some of the independent variables examined for full-scope audits in this study are not 
applicable to compilation engagements and are not included in the OLS and logistic regression 
models.  PERFORMANCE and POSITION are not included since only a statement of cash 
receipts and disbursements is presented in the compilation report, and information to compute 
key financial performance and financial position ratios are typically not available.  OPINION is 
not included since rendering an audit opinion is beyond the scope of a compilation engagement.  
SINGLEAUDIT is not included since all municipalities requiring a single audit are also required 
to complete a full-scope audit.  Also, the control variable, COUNTY, is not applicable to these 
models since all Mississippi counties received full-scope audits during the year.  The variable, 
FUNDS, is redefined as the total number of reported funds, since the major-funds classification 
applies only to full-scope audits.  
The following independent variables are examined regarding compilation engagements: 
(1) the total number of reported findings (FINDINGS), (2) the total amount of bonded and other 
long-term indebtedness (DEBT), (3) the total number of reported funds (FUNDS), (4) the total 
number of miles between the auditor’s office and the compilation client’s office (DISTANCE), 
and (5) the total number of audit and attestation engagements performed by the audit firm 
(EXPERTISE).  This section discusses the findings concerning the following research questions:  
 
Report Content and Managerial Competency 
1)  Is the total number of reported findings a significant predictor of (a) compilation 
report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated 
filing deadlines? 
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Accountability 
2) Is the total amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant 
predictor of (a) compilation report delay and  (b) compilation reports meeting or 
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
Audit Environment 
 3) Is the number funds reported in the government’s financial  
statements a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and  (b) 
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
4) Is the number of miles between the auditor’s firm and the compilation client’s 
office a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and  (b) compilation 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
5) Is the total number of governmental audit and attestation engagements performed 
by the audit firm a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) 
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines? 
 
The Sample: 
 The data used to examine municipal compilation delay were obtained from the compiled 
financial statements of Mississippi governments for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2007.  
A listing of Mississippi municipalities was obtained that contained an initial sample of 151 
entities having submitted compiled financial statements to the state auditor.  Data were missing 
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from 17 of those observations, leaving a final sample of 134.  Compiled financial statements 
were obtained for each municipality either from the website of the Mississippi Office of the State 
Auditor or directly from that office when the compiled financial statements were not present on 
the website. 
Figure 2: Frequencies in Which Compilation Reports Were Submitted to the Mississippi Office of the 
State Auditor for Fiscal-year 2007 
 
 
Descriptive Information—Compilation Engagements 
Figure 2 presents a histogram illustrating the frequencies in which Mississippi 
governments completing compilations for fiscal-year 2007 filed those compilations with the 
Mississippi Office of the State Auditor during certain ranges of days around the due date.  Table 
22 presents descriptive statistics for compilations filed on or before the state-mandated deadline 
and compilations filed after the state-mandated deadline.  Along with statistics for all 134 
governmental entities in the sample, the table presents statistics for 41 governmental entities that 
filed late compilations and 93 governmental entities that filed timely compilations.  Preliminary 
univariate analysis of each independent variable was performed.  Differences for these  
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Table 22: Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Compilations and 
a Comparison of Late and Timely Compilations 
Variables
a
 Total 
Late 
Compilations 
Timely 
Compilations 
  (n=134) (n=41) (N=93) 
Dependent Variable: DELAY 
 
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 
289.44 
(191.62) 512.46 (166.57) 191.12 (95.28) 
   Range 22 to 1,179 375 to 1,179 22 to 365 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:   
FINDINGS 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 0.89 (1.51) 1.56*** (1.84) 0.59*** (1.23) 
   Range 0 to 8 0 to 7 0 to 8 
Accountability:   
DEBT (millions) 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 0.34 (0.58) 0.38 (0.62) 0.32 (0.57) 
   Range 0 to 4.61 0 to 3.11 0 to 4.61 
Audit Environment:   
FUNDS 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 2.98 (1.13) 3.07 (1.23) 2.94 (1.09) 
   Range 1 to 6 1 to 6 1 to 6 
DISTANCE 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 27.91 (29.85) 35.05* (41.91) 24.76* (22.18) 
   Range 1 to 150 1 to 143 1 to 150 
EXPERTISE 
  
  
   Mean (Standard Deviation) 6.24 (6.05) 5.27 (4.53) 6.67 (6.59) 
   Range 1 to 24 1 to 24 1 to 24 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
  ***p<0.001 one-tailed test 
   *p<0.05 one-tailed test 
   Note: t-tests were used to determine significant differences between governments filing late compilations and 
  governments filing timely compilations 
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continuous variables were analyzed using t-tests.  Results of those tests are also presented in 
Table 22. 
The mean compilation delay (DELAY) for all entities in the sample was 289.44 days.  Of 
those entities, 30.60 percent failed to submit compiled financial statements to the Office of the 
State Auditor within the state-mandated one-year deadline.  For compilations filed in a timely 
manner, the mean delay was 191.12 days.  For compilations filed past the filing deadline, the 
mean audit delay was 512.46 days.  Results of the t-tests reveal that FINDINGS and DISTANCE 
differ significantly between timely filers and late filers.  Each of these significant variables, 
along with the other independent variables are discussed in detail below. 
 The mean total number of findings (FINDINGS) issued for entities in the sample was 
0.89.  Governmental entities filing timely compilation reports with the state received a mean total 
of 0.29 findings, while governmental entities filing late compilation reports received a mean total 
of 1.56 findings.  The results of the t-test reveals this to be a significant difference (p<0.001, one-
tailed). 
The mean dollar amount of long-term debt (DEBT) was $340,000.  For entities filing 
timely compilations, the mean dollar amount of long-term debt was $320,000.  For entities filing 
late compilations, the mean dollar amount of long-term debt was $380,000.  The results of the t-
test did not reveal this to be a significant difference. 
The mean number of funds (FUNDS) reported by entities in the sample was 2.98.  
Entities filing timely compilations reported 2.94 funds on average, while entities filing late 
compilations reported an average of 3.07 funds.  The results of the t-test did not indicate a 
significant difference regarding FUNDS. 
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The average travel distance (DISTANCE) between the auditor’s office and the 
compilation client’s office was 27.91 miles.  Those entities submitting timely compilation reports 
were 24.07 miles, on average, away from the auditors’ offices.  Entities submitting late 
compilation reports were 35.05 miles, on average, away from the auditors’ offices.  The results 
of the t-test indicated that this was a significant difference (p<0.05, one-tailed). 
For auditors captured in the sample, the mean number of governmental audit and 
attestation clients was 6.24—6.67 for those auditors associated with compilations that were filed 
in a timely manner and 5.27 for those auditors associated with compilations that were filed past 
the state-mandated deadline.  Results of the t-test did not indicate this to be a significant 
difference. 
The bivariate correlation coefficients among the independent variables included in the 
model appear in Table 23.  DEBT is positively correlated with FUNDS (0.292), and DISTANCE 
is positively correlated with FINDINGS (0.198).  To assess the presence of multicollinearity, 
variance inflation factors (VIF) and the condition indeces were examined.  No values of VIF 
were greater than 1.20.  The largest condition index (the condition number) was 8.0.  Each of 
these diagnostic measures provides evidence that no strong multicollinearity issues are present in 
the model. 
 
Results—Compilation Engagements 
In the first phase of testing, an OLS model
10
 was estimated using as the dependent variable the 
natural log of the number of days from fiscal year end until the date the compilation report
                                                          
10
 A GEE model with a robust estimator was computed and resulted in the same findings regarding 
significance. 
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was received by the Office of the State Auditor (DELAY).  The dependent variable was log 
transformed because visual inspection of the residual distribution using untransformed data 
revealed a violation of the normality assumption.  Leverage values were examined and no 
influential data points were observed in the model.  An examination of plots of the residuals 
indicated no problems with heteroskedasticity.  Table 24 presents the results of the regression.  
The model has an R
2
 of 0.141, an adjusted R
2
 of 0.107, and model F-statistic of 4.203 (p=0.001). 
 In the second phase of testing, a logistic regression analysis was used to determine how 
the variables examined in the first phase of the study affect the outcome of whether the compiled 
financial statements are filed within or beyond the state-mandated filing deadline.  The 
dependent variable in the regression (LATE) was coded 0 if the compilation was filed in a timely 
manner and 1 if the compilation was filed beyond the state-mandated one-year filing deadline.  
Table 25 presents the results of the logistic regression. 
The coefficients indicate that the overall model was significant (χ2 = 16.04, p = 0.007), 
and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicates goodness of fit (χ2 = 6.99, p = 0.537).  The model 
was able to correctly classify 97 percent of government entities that filed audits in a timely 
manner and 27 percent of those that filed late, for an overall success rate of 75 percent.  The 
model had a Cox & Snell R
2
 of 0.113, a Nagelkerke R
2
 of 0.159, and a McFadden’s R2 of 0.097.  
The following sections discuss the results of the OLS regression and the logistic regression based 
on hypothesis grouping: 
 
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency—Findings  
Hypothesis 9a predicts that the total number of findings issued on the compilation report 
will be positively associated with compilation report delay.  FINDINGS was positive and  
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Table 24: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay:  Compilation 
Engagements 
    
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p- 
  Sign Estimate Error  statistic value  
Intercept   5.276 0.180 29.305 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
FINDINGS + 0.115 0.040 2.854 0.003 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - 0.185 0.106 1.737 0.543 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + 0.000 0.055 -0.001 0.999 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.397 0.202 1.963 0.026 
EXPERTISE ± -0.018 0.010 -1.820 0.071 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 134 
    Model F-statistic 4.203 
    Prob (F-statistic) 0.001 
    R
2
 0.141 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.107 
    Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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Table 25: Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings 
of Compilation Engagements 
    
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept   -1.482 0.624 5.637 0.018 0.227 
  
     
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
FINDINGS + 0.427 0.148 8.373 0.002 1.533 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - 0.094 0.358 0.069 0.604 1.099 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS + 0.111 0.182 0.369 0.544 1.117 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.897 0.672 1.782 0.091 2.452 
EXPERTISE ± -0.062 0.041 2.335 0.127 0.940 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 134 
χ2 16.040, p=0.007 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.113 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.159 
McFadden's R
2
 0.097 
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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significant (p = 0.002, one-tailed) with respect to compilation report delay (Table 24).  This is 
consistent with the OLS results for full-scope audits.  Hypothesis 9a is supported. 
 Hypothesis 9b predicts that a higher number of reported findings will be associated with 
compilation reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  The results of the logistic 
regression analysis provides evidence that findings are significantly associated with compilation 
reports that are not filed in a timely manner (p = 0.003, one-tailed) (Table 25).  For each one-unit 
increase in the number of audit findings, the odds of a late compilation increase by 1.533.  
Hypothesis 9b is supported. 
 
Accountability—Long-Term Debt 
 
 Hypothesis 10a predicts that the amount of bonded or other long-term indebtedness will 
lead to decreased compilation report delay.  For full-scope audits in this study, the coefficient for 
the variable DEBT was in the direction predicted but was not found to be significantly associated 
with decreased audit report delay.  For compilations, the coefficient for the variable DEBT is in 
the opposite direction than was predicted (Table 24).  Hypothesis 10a is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 10b predicts that a higher amount of long-term debt will be associated with 
governments that file timely financial reports with the state.  For full-scope audits in this study, 
results of the logistic regression provided some evidence that DEBT is associated with timely 
financial statements.  For compilation engagements, however, the coefficient for DEBT is in the 
opposite direction than was predicted (Table 25).  Hypothesis 10b is not supported. 
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Environment—Funds 
 Hypothesis 11a predicts that the total number of reported funds will increase compilation 
report delay.  FUNDS is defined as the total number of funds reported on the government’s 
financial statements.  The results of the OLS regression indicate that the total number of reported 
funds is not significantly associated with longer compilation report delay (Table 24).  Hypothesis 
11a is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 11b predicts that a higher number of reported funds will be associated with 
compilations filed beyond the state-mandated filing deadline.  Results of the logistic regression 
indicate that FUNDS is not significantly associated with untimely financial reporting (Table 25).  
Hypothesis 11b is not supported. 
 
Audit Environment—Travel Distance 
 Hypothesis 12a predicts that a greater total travel distance (DISTANCE) between the 
auditor’s office and the compilation client’s office will be associated with longer compilation 
report delays.  The results of the OLS regression provide evidence that as the mileage traveled 
increases, so does the amount of delay in filing the compiled financial statements (p=0.026, one-
tailed) (Table 24).  Hypothesis 12a is supported. 
 Hypothesis 12b predicts that a greater travel distance between the auditor and the 
compilation client will be associated with audit reports failing to meet state-mandated filing 
deadlines.  The results of the logistic regression provide some evidence that greater travel 
distance is associated with untimely financial statement reports (p=0.091, one-tailed) (Table 25).  
This provides some support for Hypothesis 12b. 
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Audit Environment—Auditor Expertise 
 Hypothesis 13a predicts that the total number of governmental attestation engagements 
performed by an audit firm (EXPERTISE) will be associated with compilation report delay.  
Regression results provide some support that auditor expertise, as measured by the total number 
of clients, is negatively associated with compilation report delay (p=0.071, two-tailed) (Table 
24).   
 Hypothesis 13b predicts that the total number of governmental audit and attestation 
engagements performed by the audit firm will be associated with whether compilation reports 
meet state-mandated audit-filing deadlines.  The results of the logistic regression indicate no 
significant relationship between the number of audit clients and timely financial reporting (Table 
25).  Hypothesis 13b is not supported. 
 
Additional Procedures—Compilation Engagements 
Travel Distance 
Regarding the DISTANCE variable, it is reasonable to assume that the amount of auditor 
procrastination due to travel considerations might be more pronounced for auditors having 
multiple governmental audit clients.  As such, the OLS and logistic regressions were recomputed 
after omitting all observations from the sample that had auditors with only one governmental 
attestation client in fiscal-year 2007.  This reduces the sample to 117 observations.  For this 
reduced sample, the mean total travel distance between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s 
office was 29.60 miles.  For governmental entities that filed timely audits, the mean travel 
distance was 25.96 miles.  For governmental entities that filed late audits, the mean travel  
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Table 26: OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel 
Distance Contributes to Delay of Compilation Engagements 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard t- p- 
  Sign Estimate Error  statistic  value 
Intercept   5.192 0.191 27.124 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
FINDINGS + 0.117 0.040 2.899 0.003 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - 0.179 0.105 1.710 0.955 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + 0.019 0.055 0.346 0.730 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.414 0.200 2.068 0.021 
EXPERTISE ± -0.016 0.010 -11.619 0.108 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    n 117 
    Model F-statistic 4.434 
    Prob (F-statistic) 0.001 
    R
2
 0.166 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.129 
    Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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Table 27: Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel 
Distance Contributes to Late Filings of Compilation Reports 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted β Standard Wald's p-value Exp(β) 
  Sign   Error χ2     
Intercept   -1.398 0.679 4.237 0.04 0.247 
  
     
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
FINDINGS + 0.400 0.152 6.935 0.004 1.492 
  
     
  
Accountability: 
     
  
DEBT (millions) - 0.072 0.360 0.040 0.580 1.075 
  
     
  
Audit Environment: 
     
  
FUNDS + 0.134 0.187 0.511 0.238 1.143 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.906 0.680 1.777 0.092 2.474 
EXPERTISE ± -0.073 0.045 2.719 0.099 0.929 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    N 117 
χ2 15.059, p=0.01 
Cox & Snell R
2
 0.121 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.169 
McFadden's R
2
 0.103 
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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distance was 37.46 miles.  The results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 26, and the 
results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 27.   
The results of the regressions on this reduced sample are similar to the results of the 
regressions on the full sample of compilation engagements.  Again, the results of the OLS 
regression provide evidence of a positive relationship between DISTANCE and DELAY 
(p=0.021, one-tailed).  The logistic regression model again provides some evidence that 
DISTANCE is associated with compilations that are filed after the deadline (p=0.092, one-
tailed). 
 
Auditor Expertise 
 Payne & Jenson (2002) measured auditor expertise with an indicator variable coded 1 if 
the auditor performed two or more municipal audits within their sample and 0 otherwise.  The 
results of their study provided evidence that as the number of municipal audit clients increases, 
the audit report delay decreases.  To remain consistent with this previous study, the OLS 
regression and logistic regression were recomputed after expressing the EXPERTISE variable as 
a categorical variable coded 1 for audit firms that performed more than one governmental audit 
or attestation engagement during the year and 0 otherwise.  The results (not tabulated) provided 
no further evidence that the number of government attestation clients was significantly 
associated with audit report delay or timely compilations. 
 
Funds 
Payne & Jenson (2002) included an indicator variable coded 0 if the entity reported three 
or fewer funds and 1 if the entity reported more than three funds.  Their results provided no 
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evidence of a significant relationship between the total number of reported funds and audit report 
delay.  To approach this area in a way that is consistent with prior research, the FUNDS variable 
in this study was redefined in a way similar to Payne & Jenson (2002).  The variable was 
expressed as a categorical variable with 0 indicating three or fewer reported major funds and 1 
indicating greater than three reported major funds.  The results (not tabulated) provided no 
further evidence that the number of funds is significantly associated with audit report delay or 
timely compilations. 
 
A Different Measure of DELAY 
For purposes of comparison, the OLS model from this study of compilation engagements 
was examined after re-defining DELAY as the number of days between the entity’s fiscal year 
end and the date on the audit report.  Results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 28.  In 
this model, the variables FINDINGS and DISTANCE remain significant and in the predicted 
direction.  The most striking difference occurs with the EXPERTISE variable.  In the original 
model (Table 24), this variable was only marginally significant (p=0.071, two-tailed).  In the 
model with DELAY redefined (Table 28), EXPERTISE is statistically significant (p=0.023, two-
tailed) and associated with decreased delay between fiscal year end and the date on the audit 
report.  A comparison of the two models provides evidence that different findings may occur 
depending on how DELAY is measured in the model. 
 The analyses in this study indicate that the areas of report message content and 
managerial competency, accountability, and the audit environment may have a significant impact 
on both the timing and the timeliness of the audit or compilation report.  The following chapter 
discusses each variable considered in the study as well as the effect of each variable on audit and  
129 
 
Table 28: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for  Compilation 
Engagements; DELAY Measured by Date on Compilation Report 
 
  
Variables
a
 Predicted Coefficient Standard 
t-
statistic 
p-
value 
  Sign Estimate Error     
Intercept   5.031 0.221 22.805 <0.001 
  
    
  
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency: 
  
  
FINDINGS + 0.131 0.049 2.672 0.005 
  
    
  
Accountability: 
    
  
DEBT (millions) - 0.238 0.130 1.825 0.965 
  
    
  
Audit Environment: 
    
  
FUNDS + -0.027 0.067 -0.401 0.656 
DISTANCE (hundreds) + 0.513 0.248 2.069 0.021 
EXPERTISE ± -0.028 0.012 -2.298 0.023 
a 
See Table 3 for a description of the variables 
    N 134 
    Model F-statistic 4.405 
    Prob (F-statistic) 0.001 
    R
2
 0.147 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.113 
    Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test 
     where no prediction was made. 
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compilation report timing and timeliness.  The implications of these findings are discussed along 
with potential limitations of the study and possible avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The timeliness of audited financial statements for local governmental entities is of 
primary interest to many parties, and for those reports to be relevant, they must be prepared and 
made available to the public in a timely manner.  For local governmental entities, audited 
financial statements are the primary means for communicating the results of operations and 
financial position to outside parties.  The auditor’s report also provides important information 
about the management of the government, such as the adequacy of internal controls and 
compliance with laws and regulations.   
Some smaller governmental entities prepare compiled financial statements that are, in 
lieu of a full-scope audit, subject to an independent auditor’s performance of certain agreed-upon 
procedures, such as confirmation of cash balances, verification of tax collections, and 
examination of compliance with purchasing requirements.  Like full-scope audits, these 
compilation reports are the primary means for communicating information about the 
management of the government.  To be relevant to interested users, these reports must also be 
prepared and made available to the public in a timely manner. 
In Mississippi, timely completion of county and municipal audits and compilations has 
become an important issue in the state, and new steps have been taken to help ensure that future 
timeliness will be enhanced.  This study examined what variables influence audit and 
compilation delay for local governments in Mississippi.  Since the Mississippi Code provides a 
one-year deadline for submission of the completed audits to the state auditor, this study also 
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considered the determinants of late audit and compilation report filings in Mississippi and what 
variables differ between governments that file audits or compilations late versus governments 
that file audits or compilations in a timely manner. The research questions addressed in this study 
were chosen based on the anticipated impact on audit or compilation report timeliness of (1) 
report message content and managerial competency, (2) accountability, and (3) the audit 
environment.  This chapter summarizes and discusses the findings of each of the 13 research 
questions addressed in this study, the limitations inherent in the study, and suggestions for 
possible future research. 
 
Summary of the Findings 
Research Question 1—Financial Statement Position and Performance Ratios 
Research Question 1 addressed whether the financial report message, as evidenced by 
key financial statement ratios, are a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports 
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  The key financial statement ratios 
considered in this study included a measure of financial statement position (defined as Total Net 
Assets / Total Revenues) and a measure of financial performance (defined as Change in Net 
Assets / Total Net Assets).  It was hypothesized that favorable financial statement ratios would 
represent good news that the governmental entity would desire be made public more quickly.  
The results, however, were somewhat mixed. 
Evidence from this study does not support that the governmental entity’s favorable 
financial statement position is linked with either audit delay or timely audits.  The financial 
statement position of the governmental entity was only a marginally significant predictor of 
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decreased audit delay and timely audits, and this marginal significance occurred only in 
regression models that included municipalities and not counties. 
The findings concerning the performance ratios were somewhat surprising.  A favorable 
performance ratio was not associated with decreased audit delay or with timely audits.  In 
contrast, the evidence pointed toward favorable government performance being linked with 
increased audit delay and untimely audit reports.  However, this positive relationship was 
strongest in a model that included an outlying observation.  This positive relationship was also 
noticeable in a regression model that defined audit delay as the number of days from the 
governmental entity’s fiscal year end to the date on the audit report, rather than the number of 
days to the date in which the state auditor’s office received the audit report.  Notwithstanding the 
inconsistencies regarding the dates in which auditors date audit reports, this could indicate that a 
strong performance ratio might increase the auditor’s assessment of audit risk on the 
engagement, thus delaying the audit process with the gathering of additional evidence.   
The effect of financial statement position and performance ratios has not been addressed 
in prior studies of governmental audit delay.  The interesting findings from this study indicate 
that future research in this area is warranted.  
 
Research Questions 2 and 9—Audit Findings 
Research Question 2 addressed whether the total number of reported audit findings was 
a significant predictor of audit report delay and of audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-
mandated filing deadlines.  Research Question 9 addressed the same concern as it applies to 
compilation engagements.  The effect of audit findings has previously been unexplored in the 
area of audit delay in local governments.  The results of this study provide strong evidence that 
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audit findings are associated with both increased audit delay and with untimely audits.  The total 
number of findings was also found to be significantly associated with increased compilation 
report delay as well as untimely compilations.   
Reasons for this result could be due to a large number of audit findings being perceived 
as bad news, thus providing incentive for the governmental entity to delay reporting.  A large 
number of findings could also be an indication of less competent management, which could 
delay the audit process for many reasons, such as the auditor not being able to obtain needed 
records because they are either incomplete or poorly executed and maintained.  Findings could 
also be issued as a result of the discovery of inadequate internal controls, for which the auditor 
will, as a result, be required to perform additional procedures. 
 Further analysis was performed on the effect of the materiality of audit findings on audit 
timeliness.  Findings classified by the auditor as material weaknesses were significantly 
associated with audit delay but were only marginally significantly associated with late audits.  
Models including only findings not classified as material weaknesses revealed that these findings 
were significantly associated with both total audit delay and late audits.  These results, taken as a 
whole, indicate that the quantity of audit findings have a greater effect on timeliness than does 
the magnitude of those findings.  In other words, a larger number of problem areas appears to 
slow the audit process more than a smaller number of problem areas, regardless of the materiality 
of those problems.   
    
Research Question 3—Audit Opinion 
 Research Question 3 addressed whether a qualified or adverse audit opinion is a 
significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-
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mandated filing deadlines.  Prior research of audit delay in for-profit entities has yielded strong 
results indicating that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion is associated with longer delays in 
the audit process.  Also, Carslaw et al. (2007), in a study of audit delay in school-districts, found 
that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion is associated with longer delays in four of the five 
years analyzed.  Prior research of municipal and county audit delay, however, has been 
somewhat mixed.  Of the prior studies of county and municipal audit delay, only Payne & Jenson 
(2002) found that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion is significantly associated with 
increased audit report delay.  Three other studies, Dwyer & Wilson (1989), Rubin (1992), and 
McLelland & Giroux (2000), did not find that the audit opinion was significantly associated with 
audit delay. 
 The results of this study indicate that an adverse or qualified audit opinion has a strong 
relationship with longer delays in the audit process and with untimely audits, thus supporting the 
findings of Payne & Jenson (2002).  This finding was consistent across all models analyzed in 
the study.  There are several possible reasons for this relationship.  Bamber et al. (1993) suggests 
that qualified opinions are not likely to be issued until after the auditor has spent considerable 
time and effort pursuing additional audit procedures and other reporting alternatives in an effort 
to avoid qualification.  Also, an adverse or qualified audit opinion could be perceived as bad 
news, thus providing the governmental entity incentive to delay reporting.  The opinion could 
also be issued as a result of missing or incomplete records for which considerable time was spent 
during the audit process in an attempt to locate or have completed. 
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Research Questions 4 and 10—Long-Term Debt 
 Research Question 4 addressed whether the amount of bonded and other long-term 
indebtedness is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports meeting or failing to 
meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  Research Question 10 addressed the same concern as it 
relates to compilation engagements.  It was predicted that the increased accountability to 
creditors would result in decreased audit delay and timely filed reports.  The results of the study 
provided no evidence that magnitude of debt is associated with decreased audit delay.  However, 
the results show a marginally significant (p=0.06) association of DEBT with audits that were 
filed on time.  Regarding compilation engagements, DEBT had no significant association with 
shorter audit delay or with timely audits. 
 The result regarding the effect of long-term debt on full-scope audit engagements is 
interesting.  As the magnitude of debt increases, this does not lead to shorter audit delays.  
However, governmental entities carrying larger amounts of long-term debt typically manage to 
submit their audited financial statements to the state auditor before the deadline.  This result is 
likely due to the creditors’ expectations of timely information regarding the government’s ability 
to make payments on debt when they become due and to assess the government’s long-term 
debt-paying ability.  This has important implications in that it appears that either the auditor or 
the governmental entity are making a conscious effort to complete certain audits (i.e. ones in 
which the governmental entities have added accountability to creditors) in a timely manner. 
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Research Question 5—Single Audit Act 
Research Question 5 addressed whether the earlier filing deadline required under the  
Single Audit Act is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports meeting or 
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  Results of the study provided no evidence that 
these earlier deadlines affect audit delay or audit timeliness.  Only approximately one-fourth of 
the entities in the sample requiring a Single Audit actually submitted the required Single Audit 
reports within the nine-month deadline.  The majority of those entities also managed to submit 
audit reports to the state auditor in a timely manner.  However, the fact that almost three-fourths 
of the entities in the sample filed late Single Audit reports allows one to deduce that if the earlier 
filing requirements of the Single Audit reports do not affect the timeliness of those Single Audit 
reports, they will neither have an effect of decreasing the timing of the full-scope audit reports 
that are to be submitted to the state auditor.  This is, however, a complex area in which further 
research is warranted. 
 
Research Questions 6 and 11—Reported Funds 
 Research Question 6 addressed whether the number of major funds reported in the 
government’s financial statements is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  Research Question 11 
addressed the same concern as it relates to compilation engagements.  Payne & Jenson (2002) is 
the only study of governmental audit delay that examined the effect of the number of funds on 
report timing.  No significant relationship was observed in that study.  Those results, however, 
were based on data prior to GASB Statement No. 34, which required the identification and 
reporting of only major funds.  This study addresses whether funds defined as major funds have 
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an impact on audit timeliness.  Similar to the findings of Payne & Jenson (2002), no evidence 
was observed that the number of major funds was associated with longer audit delay or late 
audits.  This result was also observed for compilation engagements. 
Payne & Jenson (2004) defined the number of funds as a categorical variable, coded 1 if 
the government reported more than three funds and 0 otherwise.  The results from the current 
study are based on defining the variable as the total number of reported funds.  As an additional 
procedure, the FUNDS variable was re-defined consistent with Payne & Jenson (2002).  This 
resulted in FUNDS being only marginally significantly associated with late audits but not 
significantly associated with total audit delay.  Based on the evidence, the number of reported 
funds appears to have little impact on audit timeliness. 
 
Research Questions 7 and 12—Travel Distance 
 Research Question 7 addressed whether the travel distance between the auditor’s office 
and the audit client’s office is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports 
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  Research Question 12 addressed the 
same concern as it relates to compilation engagements.  This area is previously unexplored in 
studies of governmental audit delay. 
 For full-scope audit engagements, greater travel distance has no significant association 
with the length of time to complete the audit.  Greater travel distance is, however, marginally 
significant with regard to late audits.  This relationship becomes much more pronounced when 
audit firms with only one governmental attestation client are removed from the sample.  This 
provides some indication that audit firms might have an element of procrastination regarding 
clients that require more travel time, especially when they have other audit clients that are closer 
139 
 
in proximity.  This finding could also be indicative of auditors wishing to ensure that the audits 
of the county or municipality in which they reside be completed in a more timely manner, 
whether it be due to pressure from the local government officials or the auditor’s desire to 
maintain a personal image in his or her own hometown. 
 The effect of travel distance on the timing of the attestation engagement appears to play a 
much more important role in compilation engagements.  Greater travel distance was found to be 
significantly associated with longer delays in the compilation engagement and marginally 
significantly associated with late compilation reports.  This same result was observed when audit 
firms with only one governmental attestation client are removed from the sample.   
 
Research Questions 8 and 13—Auditor Expertise 
 Research Question 8 addressed whether the total number of governmental attestation 
engagements performed by the audit firm is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit 
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.  Research Question 13 
addressed the same concern as it relates to compilation engagements.  No directional prediction 
was made regarding this variable since while auditor expertise should result in a more efficient 
audit, numerous attestation clients with the same due date necessarily results in longer delays for 
some engagements because of the increased workload. 
 Results from the study provide little evidence that auditor expertise, as measured by the 
number of governmental attestation clients, has an association with audit timeliness.  This result 
is likely a result of the offsetting effect of expertise with increased workload as previously 
discussed.  With compilation engagements, a marginal association with shorter delay was 
observed. 
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Implications 
 Full-scope audits of governmental entities are complex, and many factors affect the 
timing and timeliness of those audits.  The overall results from this study indicate that report 
message content and managerial competency have an important effect on audit delay.  
Specifically, a greater number of audit findings and the issuance of a qualified or adverse audit 
opinion result in longer delays and later audits.  
There are a number of actions governments can take to improve the timeliness of their 
audits.  Governments wishing to obtain a more timely audit should take steps to ensure that past 
audit findings are corrected as soon as possible.  Corrections of internal control findings would 
result in less risk assessment by the auditor in future audits.  Corrections of findings regarding 
insufficient records would result in a more efficient audit in the future.  Fewer reported audit 
findings coupled with an unqualified audit opinion would be perceived as good news by the 
governmental entity, and that entity would have incentive to accelerate the reporting of that 
news. 
Compilation engagements involve the audit firm performing certain agreed-upon 
procedures with regard to the governmental entity’s financial operations.  These agreed-upon 
procedures are uniform, and all compilation reports observed in the sample were consistent in 
format.  With each compilation engagement appearing to be of relatively equal complexity, it 
appears that audit firms are quicker to complete compilation engagements that require relatively 
less travel distance and engagements in which fewer findings are reported.  Governments 
wishing to obtain a more timely compilation might consider choosing an audit firm that is in 
closer proximity to the government’s offices.   Also, as with governments wishing to obtain a 
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more timely full-scope audit, it is important for compilation clients to correct reported findings 
as soon as possible. 
To corroborate the implications of these findings, an auditor from a Mississippi CPA firm 
in this sample was contacted by telephone.  That auditor indicated that “messier” audits are the 
ones that take the longest to complete.  “Messier” audits include those in which records are 
missing, bank reconciliations are not completed, and fixed assets are not properly recorded, 
among other things—all of which would involve an audit finding issued on the report.  The 
auditor was from a firm that has several governmental audit clients, and he responded in the 
affirmative when questioned concerning whether travel distance tends to play a role as to which 
audits are completed first.  The auditor cited one particular client in which their records were in 
“terrible shape” and the travel distance was much greater than any of their other clients.  Upon 
further analysis, the researcher determined that the particular governmental entity had a total 
audit report delay in fiscal-year 2007 of greater than 850 days. 
 
Limitations 
The results of this study are subject to some important limitations.  The sample for this 
study was not randomly obtained but instead uses data from counties and municipalities from 
one state.  As such, caution should be used in generalizing these results to other geographic 
regions.  Also, the smaller populations of the observations in this study are not comparable to the 
larger populations of the samples examined in prior studies.  Since this study examines several 
variables not addressed in prior studies, the findings regarding those variables may not be 
generalizable to entities with larger populations.  Also, at the time of data collection, there still 
existed some governmental entities in Mississippi that had yet to file an audited or compiled 
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financial report to the Office of the State Auditor, and these extreme cases might have had an 
influential effect on the results.   
In logistic regression, a rule of thumb states that about ten events per variable are 
necessary in order to get reasonably stable estimates of the regression coefficients (Peduzzi et al. 
1996).  The logistic regression model for full-scope-audit entities in the study has about seven 
events per variable.  Although more recent research has concluded that the “Rule of Ten” can be 
relaxed (Vittinghoff & McCulloch 2006), an increased sample size in this study could have 
possibly led to different conclusions. 
Finally, the explanatory power of the OLS model for the full-scope-audit entities in this 
study compares quite favorably to the models used in prior studies.  The explanatory model of 
the OLS model for compilation entities, however, is weaker in comparison.  Future research will 
be warranted to gain a better understanding of those areas that influence delay for these types of 
engagements. 
 
Future Research 
This is the first study to consider the timeliness of governmental compilation 
engagements.  As previously mentioned, the explanatory model of the OLS model for 
compilation engagements is weaker in comparison to the OLS model for full-scope audit 
engagements.  Future research should consider additional variables that might affect the 
timeliness of this type of engagement.  Also, given that the dependent variable is a time-to-event 
variable, another statistical approach other than OLS regression, such as survival analysis, might 
be used to analyze the data. 
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Also, the smaller populations of the observations in this study are not comparable to the 
larger populations of the samples examined in prior studies.  Since this study examines several 
variables not addressed in prior studies, future research might address the effect of these 
variables on larger entities to gain a better understanding of their overall effect on audit 
timeliness. 
The findings in this study regarding the effect of financial statement position and 
performance ratios were mixed.  In the case of the performance ratio, the effect on audit 
timeliness was opposite of that expected.  Future research could examine these ratios as well as 
other financial statement ratios and their effects on audit timeliness. 
The expectation that the earlier filing deadline for Single Audit reports would result in 
shorter audit delay was not observed in this study.  A deeper analysis revealed that only one-
fourth of the entities in the sample filed Single Audit reports before the deadline.  A future study 
might examine factors that affect delay in filing the required Single Audit reports. 
Finally, this study captures data in Mississippi prior to the state’s enactment of rules that 
establish ramifications for late audits filed after 2010.  As such, the findings from this study will 
provide a reference point for a future study concerning the successfulness of these steps after 
they have been instituted in Mississippi.  This study is an important first step in determining 
whether “the goal of increasing the availability of timely information has been hampered by the 
absence of a filing deadline” (NFMA 1998).  
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